That’s kind of what I mean by a “command and control problem”. The basic issue was making sure shells from guns located ten or fifteen kilometres from the line of attack landed on hidden or otherwise difficult-to-find targets without falling short, or giving the defenders enough time to recover. When you’re more or less relegated to primitive field telephones and runners to coordinate, that meant some sort of arrangement would have to be planned out.
By 1917 or so, the Anglo-French armies had certainly wrapped their heads around the idea of timing the infantry attack around the artillery, as opposed to the other way around. Individual Tommies and Poilus (and their immediate COs) could respond to the movement of a creeping barrage more effectively than a heavy gun battery 15 km away would respond to an infantry battalion which doesn’t have any effective way of sending signals.
However, the ability to shift operational reserves via dense and well-developed transport networks meant that even if the attack was an initial success, the defenders would have reserves moved up before the successful attackers could move their guns up to exploit it - leading to situations like the end of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, when the Canadian Corps was in sight of Arras, but couldn’t move on it because it’d take a week for their artillery to move up.
While that was technically an operational hurdle, the solution was doctrinal: namely the idea of carrying artillery with the infantry attack, in the form of hand grenades, portable automatic weapons, infantry mortars, and ultimately tanks.
I’d argue that the Pacific War showed what happens when you have one problem solved (better coordinated supporting fires through more effective communications technology) and the other problem half-solved. Unlike a British infantry battalion in 1914, a USMC battalion thirty years later did have some variety of portable artillery and automatic weapons, in the form of infantry mortars, flamethrowers and light machine guns. However, they rarely had the support of armour or SPGs. The result was that they could still take ground, but their ability to sustain that offensive was considerably less compared to say, that of Panzergruppe Kleist in the Battle of France, or 5th Guards Tank Army in Operation Bagration.