The point that not only would they starve because there’s nobody to farm anymore and no land fit for it, it would also be too cold to succeed anyway?
Because that’s supposed to be a good thing? That’s just gonna kill more people.
Also what remnants? Good, you declared martial law, now you just have to get your military across to a big city through a nuked landscape with no supplies.
Play the game with high hacking, you don’t know as much as you think.
Also estimates aren’t worth anything, especially when you add Russia into the mix, which doesn’t matter because the US alone has more than a thousand.
Military doctrines don’t matter once the nukes are actually launched and everyone with the big red button is panicking. And military doctrine dictate that if a place would just no sell your attack, you attack something more vulnerable to weaken it.
Non-involved parties like France who also got nuked? Good luck invading the US, Russia or China after that.
Did you even play the demo?
Yeah and those reserves tend to be inaccessible to big cities without massive infrastructure to deliver said food. AKA it’s worthless because you can’t get it and probably don’t know where it is.
But you seem to think New York is just suddenly gonna feed itself while isolated, with the infrastructure collapsed and with a nuked country side so you seem to underestimate basically everything, including radiations.
Also you realize that people are gonna feel those radiations for the 3 weeks before it’s considered ‘safe’, right? 90% of people just don’t have anything to get away from that. And we’re talking safe as in ‘doesn’t die of immediate radiaion poisoning’, not ‘does not die at 40 of cancer and all the babies die or are stillborn from contaminated food and water’.
That does, however, still not support your underlying argument.
Yes, maintaining order is important to avoid unnecessary death and anarchy.
You seriously overestimate the level of devastation nuclear weapons cause. The highest-yield nuclear bomb in the current US arsenal has “only” 1.2 megatons, in the Russian arsenal between 5 and 6 megatons.
"In his 2013 book Command and Control, the author Eric Schlosser tried to scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 Damascus incident, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn’t detonate, Schlosser claims that ‘if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone’.
But that’s not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the Titan II missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon would have caused destruction across 0.2% of the state. That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes."
“To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, 2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy less than 5% of the territory of the US.” The understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn't match reality
Then I shall do that, however, even if there is another cause behind it, denying the other party control over the South Chinese Sea is reason enough.
Doctrines matter, and so do political theories in the context of international conflicts concerning how nations operate.
France is a NATO member and, therefore, not “non-involved,” unless you wish to argue that NATO members (or US allies in East Asia for that matter) would be considered “non-involved” parties.
If the US military exists only in name and the US has no nuclear arsenal, then Mexico could feasibly conquer large parts of the US once the initial radiation has become “safe”. The same applies to India potentially conquering large parts of China if the Chinese military has been decimated and their nuclear arsenal has been exhausted.
Nations would attempt to maintain order, if they can. Those who would fail to comply, suffer the consequences of their actions.
Again, you overestimate the area even the highest-yield nuclear weapons in nations’ respective arsenals would devastate.
They would not, if they either were far away enough or used the window of opportunity before the fallout starts to reach a basement or shelter that is sufficiently deep underground. (That’s also why some of Europe’s metro stations could be used as nuclear shelters.)
Having researched this topic thoroughly, I am well aware of these systems and their theoretical capabilities. In a hypothetical nuclear escalation scenario like mine, it’s logical to assume that these nations would activate their ABM systems to protect major population centers and critical military bases.
However, the effectiveness of these ABM systems in a real-world, large-scale nuclear conflict is highly questionable. As highlighted in this study No US missile defense system proven capable against 'realistic' ICBM threats: Study - Breaking Defense by the American Physical Society, there are significant limitations and challenges that these systems face. The study, which specifically examined the capability of the United States’ missile defense systems against a hypothetical North Korean strike, concluded that no system developed so far has been proven effective against realistic ICBM threats.
The primary reasons for this skepticism are manifold:
Countermeasures and Sophistication of ICBMs: Modern ICBMs, especially those from advanced nuclear states, are equipped with sophisticated countermeasures that can easily deceive or overwhelm current ABM systems. This includes decoys, jamming, and evasive maneuvers that can render intercept attempts ineffective.
Volume of Attack : In the event of a full-scale nuclear exchange, the sheer volume of missiles launched would likely exceed the interceptive capabilities of current ABM systems. This would be particularly true if multiple warheads and decoys are employed by the attacking nation.
Technological Limitations and Reliability : The APS study also pointed out the technological limitations of current systems like the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and the challenges in developing futuristic options like directed energy weapons and space-based interceptors. The reliability of these systems in real combat scenarios is questionable, as evidenced by mixed results in testing environments that are often less challenging than actual combat scenarios.
Testing Limitations : The constraints on realistic testing of these systems, due to safety concerns and other factors, mean that their actual combat effectiveness remains largely unproven.
Geographical and Operational Constraints : Defending an entire nation like the United States, with its vast geography, against a barrage of ICBMs is a daunting task. While it might be possible to defend key areas, providing comprehensive coverage is currently beyond the reach of existing technologies.
In conclusion, while the idea of missile defense is appealing and has been pursued vigorously by many nations, the current state of technology and strategic limitations suggest that these systems are not yet capable of providing reliable defense against a sophisticated ICBM attack. This skepticism is supported by the APS study and several other assessments by experts in the field. Therefore, my scenario assumes that the US and other nations are using their ABM systems, but they have limited success and most of the warheads reach their targets.
You are correct, there was no mention of the activation of NATO Article 4. I might add this to one of the news reports, because it would definitely happen in my scenario.
I agree with your first statement. According to my research, radiation levels would be survivable after 2-3 weeks, if your location is not too close to a ground zero (long term health effects like cancer are of course still a concern in such a situation).
I have to disagree with your second statement. Starvation will be a major problem after a full scale nuclear war. Let me list some key reasons for that:
Nuclear explosions would likely target or incidentally affect key agricultural areas and infrastructure. This includes the destruction of farms, transportation networks, and storage facilities. The loss of these critical components would severely disrupt the production, distribution, and storage of food.
The fallout from nuclear explosions would lead to widespread radioactive contamination. While not directly fatal anymore after a certain amount of time, this radioactivity would still pose a major health threat when being absorbed with food. The contamination would affect large swathes of arable land, making them unsuitable for farming.
A large-scale nuclear war could inject massive amounts of dust and soot into the atmosphere, potentially leading to a phenomenon known as “nuclear winter.” This involves a significant drop in global temperatures due to the blocking of sunlight, disrupting climatic patterns essential for agriculture. Reduced sunlight and altered weather patterns would lead to crop failures and reduced agricultural productivity worldwide.
The global food supply system is highly interconnected and relies on complex logistics networks. A nuclear war would disrupt these supply chains, making it difficult to transport food from places of production to where it’s needed. The breakdown of these networks would exacerbate food shortages, even in regions not directly affected by the nuclear blasts.
Nuclear war would result in massive displacement of populations, leading to overcrowding in certain areas. This would strain the available resources, including food, in these regions, making it difficult to provide for the sudden increase in population.
The environmental impact of nuclear war would lead to significant loss of biodiversity and disruption of ecosystems. This would affect food sources not just for humans but also for animals, leading to a cascading effect on the entire food chain.
So, while good resource management will help certain groups of people to survive the food crisis after such a devastating war, most citizens would soon feel the effects of the disrupted supply chains. Resources like food and water and their scarcity in this post-apocalyptic world will be a big issue in my game.
Thank you for your clarification, I wasn’t sure about the implied scale of the nuclear exchange.
That makes sense, however, a few major cities (or other targets) would likely not be impacted, especially those that would be defended by the more advanced Arrow 3 system (, e.g., Germany and Israel).
I did not intend to express that no one would starve. People in areas of the world with famines and a high prevalence of malnutrition could be severely impacted by the disruption of global trade and their dependence on foreign aid.
I intended to express that significant populations could be saved by proper resource management, e.g., restrictions on caloric intake (adjusted for a person’s required daily caloric intake).
Further, implementing a triage-like system for resources (and who gets access to those) could contribute to reducing the mortality rates of people who are considered more likely to survive. (This would only be possible if the government (or at least members of it) survived, and the military were able to enforce this.)
There are some relevant, major pieces of information you may not be taking into consideration.
1.Strategic Arsenal, Stockpiles, and Cumulative Strategic Arsenals in Megatonnage by Country
Russia:
USA: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2020.1859865
Strategic Arsenal: approximately 1,800 deployed warheads, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 1,000 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and 100 tactical bombs are at European bases.
Stockpiles: approximately 5 500 warheads
Cumulative Strategic Arsenals in Megatonnage: approximately 820 (2021) Note: The US has an unspecified number of 1.2 MT nuclear warheads according to the table
China: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713
Strategic Arsenal: unclear number of deployed warheads, of those in stockpiles, 240 are on intercontinental ballistic missiles, 72 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 20 are at bomber bases.
Stockpiles: approximately 410 warheads
Cumulative Strategic Arsenals in Megatonnage: estimated at 294 megatons in 2009 Note: China has 6 4-5 MT nuclear warheads according to the table
France: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2023.2223088
Strategic Arsenal: Nearly all of France’s warheads are deployed or operationally available for deployment on short notice. 240 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 40 are at bomber bases, and 10 are for carrier-based aircraft.
Stockpiles: approximately 290 warheads
Cumulative Strategic Arsenal in Megatonnage: 51.6
TLDR:
Few nuclear powers have megaton nuclear warheads.
2.Nuclear Policy by Country
Russia: ”To retaliate against an ongoing attack ‘against critical governmental or military sites’ by ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to retaliate against ‘the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy;’” does not have a no-first-use policy.
“The fact that Russian military planners are pursuing a broad range of upgraded and new versions of nuclear weapons suggests that the real doctrine goes beyond basic deterrence and toward regional war-fighting strategies, or even weapons aimed at causing terror.
One widely-cited example involves the so-called Status-6—known in Russia as ‘Poseidon’ and in the United States as ‘Kanyon’—a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo that a Russian government document described as intended to create “areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for long periods of time.”
USA: “Just like previous NPRs, the Biden administration’s NPR rejected policies of nuclear ‘no-first-use’ or ‘sole purpose,’ instead preferring to leave the option open for nuclear weapons to be used under ‘extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.’”
China: “China’s official policy identifies self-defense and counter-strike response as key guidelines for its military strategy and reiterates a historical commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons.”
“The People’s Liberation Army (China’s principal military force) has maintained a ‘low alert level’ for its nuclear forces and keeps most of its warheads at its regional storage facilities and its central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range.
The 2022 Pentagon report reaffirmed this posture, stating that China ‘almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a peacetime status—with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.’”
“The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review suggests that China’s trajectory of expanding and improving its nuclear arsenal could ‘provide [China] with new options before and during a crisis or conflict to leverage nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, including military provocations against U.S. Allies and partners in the region’ Yet, there is so far no public indication that China’s nuclear strategy is more aggressive or adventuristic. Instead, the Pentagon assesses that the PLA most likely prioritizes conflict de-escalation when considering nuclear strike targets and would probably seek to avoid an extended series of nuclear exchanges against a superior adversary.”
“Additionally, during the October 2022 UN General Assembly First Committee session on nonproliferation, Chinese ambassador Li reaffirmed the policy: ‘China has solemnly committed to no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally.’” (This means China would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon-stats nations
UK: does not have a no-first-use policy, 1 of 4 SSBNs always deployed, 2 can be deployed on short notice
France: does not have a no-first-use policy
India: has a no-first-use and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states policy, however, “nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”
Pakistan: operates under a nuclear doctrine that it calls “full spectrum deterrence,” mainly aimed at deterring India, includes counter value, counter force and battlefield targets; does not have a no-first-use policy
Israel: deliberate ambiguity, could consider pre-emptive strike, likely has second strike capabilities; “if Israel’s defences fail and its population centers are threatened, the Samson Option, an all-out attack against an adversary, would be employed.” Nuclear weapons and Israel - Wikipedia
Conclusion:
China’s nuclear doctrine is at odds with the Chinese first strike I encountered in my playthrough as China maintains a NFU policy.
Further, I also wonder how under the Chinese nuclear doctrine “non-nuclear-weapon states” and “nuclear-weapon-free zones” would be interpreted, especially concerning US allies, even more so those part of the US nuclear umbrella (NATO, South Korea, Japan).
Would China distinguish between nations with their own nuclear weapons (USA, France, UK), nations that are part of the US nuclear sharing (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey), nations that are solely part of the US nuclear umbrella but do not host US nuclear weapons (e.g., other Nato members, Japan, South Korea, Australia), and other major non-Nato allies (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, etc.)?
Further, considering the significantly smaller nuclear arsenal of China (when compared with the arsenal of the United States), China’s NFU policy, and China’s “low alert level,” how would China be able to deploy their largely non-deployed warheads in the given amount of time?
I would also be curious why Russia would launch its own nuclear weapons when China does before the US (and allies’) retaliatory strike against China. Considering that China and Russia are not formal military allies, and retaliation from NATO would be imminent, wouldn’t it be far more strategic for Russia to wait for NATO allies to launch their retaliatory strikes against China and either not launch their own nuclear weapons or only launch their own nuclear weapons, after the Chinese first strike has struck the US and allies (potentially reducing their capabilities for future counterstrikes), and the US and allies have launched their retaliatory strike targeting China (thereby reducing the number of warheads which could target Russia)?
Further, I would like to ask how full-scale nuclear escalation relates to the nuclear doctrine of countries and the realities that would be considered in a nuclear escalation. For example, it would be astute for a nation to retain a significant portion of its nuclear arsenal for further retaliatory strikes, this has also been emphasized in several discussions I’ve come across, generally it was assumed that a nation would likely retain at least 50% of their strategic arsenal (deployed weapons).
Assuming that China’s “low level alert” would mean that 50% (it is probably far, far less) of their nuclear warheads are deployed, and another 50% are retained for further retaliatory strikes, that would imply that China launches only approximately 103 nuclear warheads.
I would argue that 103 nuclear warheads would be insufficient for a decapitation strike against the US, even more so against Nato, and major US allies. If those 103 nuclear warheads were to not only target the US but also the US allies, I would further make the argument that current ABM systems would be able to neutralize a significant amount of them.
Even by launching all of its 6 4-5 MT nuclear warheads and specifically targeting the most populous US targets through counter-value strikes (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Washington D.C.) (those would very likely be airburst, not surface burst detonations; simplified airburst results in less radiation, less fallout, and greater spread of damage; surface bursts are more localized and apply more direct pressure (e.g., to neutralize hardened missile sites), and cause more fallout), the strikes would result in approximately only (New York: 3.25 million fatalities, 4.65 million injuries; Los Angeles: 1.45 million fatalities, 3.05 million injuries; Chicago: 1.23 million fatalities, 1.75 million injuries; Dallas 0.53 million fatalities, 1.24 million injuries; Houston: 0.67 million fatalities, 1.41 million injuries; Washington D.C.: 1.01 million fatalities, 1.40 million injuries), for a total of only ~8.14 million fatalities, and 13.5 million injuries for metropolitan regions with a cumulative population of 63.28 million people. This means only 12.86% would die from these strikes directly while a further 21.33% of people would be injured. Even if we assume that 75% of the injured die and that due to a lack of crisis management, resource scarcity, and radiation, an additional third of the non-injured population dies, then still 31.13 million people would survive. NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein
Targets would further likely include ICBM bases, nuclear storage depots, command structures, naval bases, and aircraft bases, which would require a considerable amount of nuclear warheads. I assume that strikes targeting military targets would tend to be surface burst detonations.
Considering the high number of military targets, it seems rather unlikely to me that a Chinese first strike could amount to a “decapitation strike,” or even target agricultural areas in a way that threatens food security in the US.
If the US then were to launch 50% of its deployed nuclear warheads to strike China, that would imply that the US would launch 900 nuclear warheads, a significantly higher number than the Chinese warheads targeting US targets. China would be significantly more affected due to its higher population density when compared with the population density of the US.
3. Addressing the Threat of Nuclear Winter
“The average warhead size in the USA arsenal is 330 kt. The Russian average is higher, but not enough to change this outcome. To cause a nuclear winter the debris clouds and smoke have to be elevated above the troposphere into the high stratosphere. Any debris or smoke that is released into the troposphere (below 70,000 feet) quickly rains out in the weather within a few days to a week or so max. Nuclear weapons yields do not affect the environment on a linear scale , that is to say that a 1 megaton bomb, even though it is 10 x more energy than 100 kt bomb, doesn’t mean it produces 10 x more destruction. Thermal radiation decays as the inverse square while blast decays as the inverse cube of distance from the detonation point. Much of that extra heat and energy goes straight up and drops off quickly as distance is increased from the point of detonation. With smaller yields the energy isn’t enough to breach the stratosphere, and for bombs that size the earth has its own protection mechanism for particles released in the troposphere called the weather, and it is extremely efficient.
The only way to get particles to stay aloft longer is to blast them considerably higher than 70,000 feet. The reason this won’t happen today is that the world has eliminated megaton-size bombs almost completely, and shortly it will be complete as the last ones are dismantled. Russia and the US both have eliminated megaton size weapons from the high-alert strategic forces (ICBM’s & SLBM’s).
It is very unlikely that the arsenals of the nuclear powers have a sufficient number of high-yield nuclear weapons to cause a nuclear winter. Nuclear winter is unlikely to occur.
4. Addressing the Area Damaged by Nuclear War
“As we have all heard in the past that there were enough nuclear weapons to kill everyone several times over, let me put that myth to rest. Hypothetical scenario for maximum damage: Starting in an arbitrary corner of the USA (or if you prefer … Canada) take the entire world’s inventory of nuclear weapons (10,000 active and stockpiled) and place each one in its own circle covering 100 square miles. Using a world average yield size of 500 kt, this sets up the scenario for maximum destruction. If all the warheads are then elevated to 6000 feet, the height for maximum destruction and fatalities, and then detonated. Each bomb would make a 10 km radius of destruction from its center with 3rd & 2nd degree burns on the outskirts of this radius. The fallout would be minimal with only air bursts, most dangers would be gone within hours or days after the blasts. Using every bomb in existence today as laid out in this hypothetical scenario, the area of assured destruction would only amount to 1/3 of the USA’s total land mass. […] On a global scale that isn’t hardly a scratch at 1/42 of the world’s total land mass.”
TLDR:
China and Russia combined have, even if China had all their nuclear weapons deployed, only 2084 deployed nuclear weapons, if those were to only strike the US, then still approximately only 6.94% of the area of the US would be destroyed.
The destroyed area would be significantly lower than many people would assume.
Thanks for the interesting articles. You raise some good points, and I would like to share my thoughts with you and anyone else interested in the underlying assumptions of my scenario.
You are absolutely correct about China and its NFU (No First Use) policy. However, there are three points I would like to add.
First, we do not know if China’s official policy aligns with its internal policies. Given what we know about how China operates, it’s plausible that the official NFU policy is merely a deception maneuver. In times of war, they may decide otherwise and launch a first strike.
Second, on some occasions, high-ranking members of the Chinese army and political leadership have openly questioned the application of the NFU policy in times of war with other nuclear powers. They stated that the policy could be changed at any time and that it had really only applied to non-nuclear weapon states. (Reference: NTI)
Third, China recently released its proposal for a new global order. The paper discusses Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and other topics. Most importantly, it addresses China’s view on nuclear weapons. While they assert that nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must never be fought, there is no mention of China’s NFU policy. This omission is significant since China often reaffirmed this policy in the past. This could indicate that they are about to officially abandon this policy or are no longer actively pursuing it. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/chinas-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-policy-change-or-false-alarm
In my scenario, I assume that multiple factors have led China to either completely abandon its NFU policy or, in the face of war with the US, decide to ignore this policy.
US allies in the Pacific region would definitely be Chinese targets in the event of a war with the US. South Korea and Japan, especially Korea with its contingent of US troops, would be attacked with tactical nuclear weapons. By attacking the US, China has nothing to lose anymore and wouldn’t care about the consequences of attacking non-nuclear weapons states.
I assume that China would be responsible only for the Asia-Pacific region. Considering their main target is the US, they would use all their strategic weapons on them and deploy their tactical weapons against countries like Japan and South Korea. If the player has called their parents, they will know that Russia is collaborating with China and has launched an attack against NATO as well. They would be targeting the countries you mentioned, basically any NATO country with its own nuclear weapons or those sharing weapons with the US.
The game is set in an undefined year in the near future (sometime in the mid/late 2020s). This means China had more time to build up their nuclear arsenal compared to today. The US government expects them to have around 1,500 warheads by 2035. Given the game’s timeframe, they might have around 700-900 warheads, which, while smaller than the US’s arsenal, is still significant. Additionally, tensions between the US and China have been high for months, making it reasonable to assume that both nations have been readying their weapons for an extended period before the final escalation.
I can’t answer this one without spoiling potential content for the players. I plan to include ways for players to discover more background information on the nuclear war and Russia’s involvement as the game progresses, so I will not divulge anything about that right now.
Regarding nuclear retaliation strategies, there are different views. Some, as you mentioned, assume that nations would retain a large portion of their weapons for a second strike, especially submarine-launched weapons. However, land-based ICBMs and, to a lesser extent, weapons launched by aircraft, would likely be fired all at once to prevent losing them to an enemy strike. The US would need to launch all of its silo-based ICBMs, as they would be prime targets for Chinese and Russian warheads. The same holds for China and Russia. Aircraft-launched missiles are also at risk of being destroyed at airbases and weapon storages, so most of them would likely be used in the first exchange to maximize their effectiveness. Submarine-based weapons are the most likely to be kept in reserve for future strikes, as they are almost undetectable. However, China would probably launch all their weapons at once to ensure complete destruction of the enemy with their first strike, to have any chance of survival.
100 warheads would indeed not be sufficient. But in my scenario, they are launching far more than that, as explained above. Also, don’t forget Russia’s involvement, who is attacking the US as well. Together, China and Russia have more than enough warheads to inflict a devastating decapitation strike against the US.
Focusing solely on immediate fatality numbers understates the impact on the US. There are many additional effects post-nuclear strike that would significantly increase fatalities. As a resource for my scenario, I used the database provided by former Strategic Planner David Teter: GitHub - davidteter/OPEN-RISOP. He assumes that in a war only between the US and Russia, over 2,000 warheads would be launched against the US, resulting in around 60 million fatalities within the first 24 hours. These fatalities only include deaths from the initial blast, thermal exposure, immediate radiation, and fallout. While 60 million is a horrific number, one must consider the likely targets. Prime targets would include dams/locks and nuclear power plants + spent nuclear fuel sites. The destruction of dams is not included in the fatality numbers, but its impact would be immense. Cities like Baton Rouge could be several meters underwater within hours due to huge flood waves. Many people not affected by the explosions themselves would perish in these floods. Attacks on spent fuel sites would be even worse, contaminating large areas with radioactive waste and killing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people who survived the initial attack. Additionally, widespread wildfires would contribute significantly to the total fatality count.
In conjunction with Russia (which would likely target military sites, while China targets population and industrial sites), China could indeed deliver a decapitating strike on the US.
The issue of Nuclear Winter is complex, with many contradictory studies and opinions. From my research and using the Nuclear War Simulator on Steam, I concluded that there would be a global cooling effect from the soot in the atmosphere. The decisive factor is not the number of detonations or the size of the warhead but the target location. In my tests, detonating four 800kt warheads above New York, Washington DC, Atlanta, and Chicago, along with a 4 MT explosion over Los Angeles, resulted in 2.1 Tg of soot in the atmosphere and a global cooling effect of 0.5 degrees Celsius. This significant cooling effect from just five detonations suggests that detonations over other major cities in the US, Europe, and Asia would lead to massive global cooling.
As I said, it’s a complex issue and there are a lot of different opinions on this. But the Nuclear War Simulator produces some pretty believable numbers in terms of fatalities and other destruction effects, so it’s pretty believable in this regard as well.
Assessing the impact of nuclear explosions based on the area directly damaged is overly simplistic. Much of the US is sparsely populated, with little reason for enemy attack. The explosions would concentrate on densely populated areas, where even a 10km radius of destruction could kill hundreds of thousands of people instantly. In less dense areas with targets like military bases or missile silos, enemies would likely use surface bursts, which cause less immediate destruction but produce massive amounts of fallout, potentially leading to significant casualties even far from ground zero. States like Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Utah, Nebraska, etc., could suffer many fatalities even with few direct detonations.
I apologize in advance for this lengthy response, take your time reading and answering it.
Part 1 of 5:
1. It is difficult to anticipate whether situational actions would align with China’s nuclear doctrine, however, the same applies to other nations. China could indeed be deceptive concerning its nuclear doctrine, but this is currently unlikely, in consideration of current Chinese activities.
“The 2022 Pentagon report confirms that: ‘China’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or [Command and Control system], or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing would probably also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat gravely threatened [China]’s survival.’” However, “regardless of what the specific red lines may be, China’s no-first-use policy probably has a high threshold. Chinese doctrine reportedly is very clear that although the alerting process could take place before an enemy nuclear strike, a Chinese nuclear strike would only take place ‘after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country.’”
Furthermore, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (one of the most reputable nonprofit organizations on the topics of nuclear weapons and disarmament, climate change, growing energy demands, and disruptive technologies), assesses that “there is no public evidence that China is implementing plans to conduct a bolt-from-the-blue first strike with nuclear weapons,” which contradicts alleged deception on the part of China concerning its nuclear doctrine, reaffirming its commitment to its NFU policy.
Similarly, “during the October 2022 UN General Assembly First Committee session on nonproliferation, Chinese ambassador Li reaffirmed the policy: ‘China has solemnly committed to no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally,’” thus reiterating China’s official policy.
2. Your first source is a report by NTI, from 2004/2005. 2.1. In academia, it is generally advised (and often required) to only use publications from the last 10 years for research in the arts, humanities, literature, history, etc., whereas in more fast-paced fields, it is more common to only cite sources from the last 2 to 3 years. Older sources may still be cited, for example, to provide historical context, however, it is generally recommended to cite reliable sources with the most current information.
While the article offers historical context in some areas, such as Major General Zhu’s controversial statements concerning China’s NFU policy, and that the Chinese government subsequently distanced itself from his statements, the article also claims that “many postulate that faced with certain defeat in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, Beijing would quickly abandon its NFU policy in order to avoid losing its ‘renegade province.’” It should be noted that this claim, however, precedes significant Chinese efforts to modernize its military, despite this other sources continue to assess that China is unlikely to be capable of winning a war against Taiwan. The NTI article concludes that “despite speculation about a shift in China’s nuclear doctrine, a careful analysis of official Chinese positions and recent trends in Chinese nuclear weapons modernization would suggest Major General Zhu Chenghu’s remarks do not provide any new clues to China’s nuclear doctrine, nor do they indicate a move towards building a more offense-capable and war-fighting nuclear posture.” 2.2. Furthermore, the NTI should be reviewed to provide context. 2.2.1 The NTI is a nonprofit organization and American foreign policy think tank, describing itself as “a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats imperiling humanity.” Nonetheless, in their 2022 annual report, the NTI expresses its intent to increase public support for a “world without nuclear weapons,” thereby demonstrating NTI’s bias towards denuclearization. While disarmament efforts such as New START (expiring in 2026), a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the US and Russia (Russia suspended its participation in 2023, but did not withdraw from the treaty), are important and reduce the threat nuclear weapons pose to international security, critics of nuclear disarmament argue that denuclearization would undermine deterrence and make conventional wars more common. 2.2.2 The NTI was founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist Ted Turner. The latter has also founded CNN, and has a reputation for his controversial statements, which have earned him the nicknames “Mouth of the South” and “Captain Outrageous”. For instance, he stated that climate change would cause most people to die and survivors to become cannibals; he has also stated that China’s (past) one-child policy should be implemented to save the Earth’s environment.
Ernest Moniz has served as the NTI’s president and CEO since 2017, having previously served as the secretary of energy under the Obama administration. In the past, he has been criticized for his conflict of interest in the MIT study “The Future of Natural Gas”.
“The Public Accountability Initiative report found that the MIT study ‘is marred by undisclosed conflicts of interest, pro-industry advocacy, and poor scholarship similar to that which resulted in retractions and resignations at other universities.’ According to the report, Moniz joined the board of a consulting firm called ICF International that has ties to the oil and gas industry just prior to the release of the MIT study - and has received more than $305,000 in effective compensation from the firm since 2011.”
News sites also reported that “Ernest Moniz has served on advisory boards for oil giant BP and General Electric, and was a trustee of the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, a Saudi Aramco-backed nonprofit organization.”
Ernest Moniz was also an informal advisor during Biden’s presidential campaign, and he was in consideration for the secretary of energy of the Biden administration.
Moniz’s previous conflict of interest, term as a member of Obama’s Cabinet, and his advisory function during Biden’s campaign lead me to have some concerns about his, and by extension the NTI’s, commitment to being a “nonprofit, nonpartisan [organization]”.
The current board of directors of the NTI further includes (non-exhaustive):
Des Browne, former UK Secretary of State for Defense, a signatory of “Global Zero” (an international group seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons)
Jerry Brown, former governor of California
Jon Huntsman, former governor of Utah, former US ambassador to China, and former US ambassador to Russia; he resigned as ambassador to China to pursue a presidential bid, prior to that he had been seen at an anti-government demonstration in China
Alexa Wesner, former US ambassador to Austria
Dr Peng Yuan, former director of China’s CICIR (operated by MSS, the Chinese Ministry of State Security, MSS is “China’s premier intelligence organization, which, since its founding in 1983, has combined traditional intelligence collection with political-influence campaigns.”)
3. Your second source is a commentary from RUSI, which describes itself as “the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank”. In the past, RUSI has been criticized by some for its ties to the “British state and military establishment”. RUSI discloses its funding, among its supporters, are the European Commission; the US Department of State; BAE Systems (Europe’s largest defence contractor); British Army, Futures Directorate; Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Lockheed Martin; and others.
(On a less serious note: have you ever heard of the proverb “China’s final warning”?)
I believe you might be confused by the terminology of “non-nuclear weapons states” and “nuclear-weapon-free zones,” and their implications. Further, tactical nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons designed for usage on battlefields, whereas strategic nuclear weapons are designed mostly to be targeted at the enemy interior far away from the war front against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets.
1. The nuclear umbrella (a guarantee by a nuclear weapons state to defend a non-nuclear allied state) of the US, includes NATO members, and further, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. 2. Of those nations part of the US nuclear umbrella, the US has stationed tactical (no mention of strategic) nuclear weapons only in: the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.
“The Belgian, Dutch, German, and Italian air forces are currently assigned an active nuclear strike role with US nuclear weapons. Under normal circumstances, the nuclear weapons are kept under the control of US Air Force personnel; their use in war must be authorized by the US president.”
“It is possible that Turkey’s role has […] been reduced to a contingency mission.”
The stationed nuclear weapons are in: Büchel (Germany, the next larger city, Koblenz, is approximately 40 km away from Büchel), Volkel (the Netherlands, the next larger cities, Eindhoven, S’hertogenbosch, Nijmegen, are approximately 25 km away), Kleine Brogel (Belgium, the next larger city, Eindhoven, is approximately 30 km away), Incirlik (Turkey, the city center of Adana is approximately 8 km away), Aviano (Italy, the next larger cities, Treviso and Udine, are approximately 48 km away), Ghedi (Italy, the next larger city, Brescia, is approximately 12 km away) 3. How would the nuclear strikes carried out by the Chinese-Russian coalition relate to major non-NATO allies?
“Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status is a designation under U.S. law [1] that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation. The Major Non-NATO Ally designation is a powerful symbol of the close relationship the United States shares with those countries and demonstrates our deep respect for the friendship for the countries to which it is extended. While MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments to the designated country.”
Major non-NATO allies (which are not also part of the US nuclear umbrella) are:
Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Thailand, Tunisia; and Taiwan
Consequently, an important question arises: which nations would be targeted by the Chinese-Russian coalition?
a) The US, and other allied nuclear-weapon states [US, France, UK]
b1) The US, other allied nuclear-weapon states, and nations part of nuclear sharing [US, France, UK, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium]
b2) The US, other allied nuclear-weapon states, nations part of nuclear sharing, and East Asian nuclear umbrella nations [US, France, UK, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, South Korea]
c1) The US, other allied nuclear-weapon states, nations part of nuclear sharing, nations part of the US nuclear umbrella [US, France, UK, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, South Korea, Japan]
c2) The US, other allied nuclear-weapon states, nations part of nuclear sharing, nations part of the US nuclear umbrella [US, France, UK, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, South Korea, Japan, Australia] [NOTE: Australia is a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which under Chinese nuclear doctrine would not be targeted by nuclear weapons]
d) Some or all of the previous nation, and some or all major non-NATO allies; considerations:
Pakistan: China and Pakistan see each other as close, strategic allies
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Morocco, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Tunisia are part of the nuclear-weapon-free zones agreement
Taiwan: nuking Taiwan is not logical if China wishes to annex Taiwan
Israel: has decent relations with China and Russia too
Egypt: joining the BRICS in 2024
e) Some or all of the previous nations, and some or all nations where the US also has military bases:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Iraq, Kosovo, Kuwait, Bahamas, Bahrain, Cuba (Guantanamo), Djibouti (also hosts a Chinese military base), Singapore, Honduras, New Zealand, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, UAE [NOTE: in 2024 Saudi Arabia and the UAE will join the BRICS]
f) Some or all of the previous nations, and nations where there are other “enduring” US military installations (e.g., Niger, Chad, Gabon, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ghana) [NOTE: all of those are nuclear-weapon-free zones]
g) Some or all of the previous nations, and also nations where France and the UK have foreign bases and/or their overseas territories (which are nuclear-weapon-free zones as per international agreements)
Other important questions and considerations are:
Does Iran have nuclear weapons in your scenario? If yes, they’d probably be part of the Chinese-Russian coalition due to their existing ties. (This would also increase the likelihood of Israel being targeted, as Iran wishes to destroy Israel.)
Is North Korea part of the Russian-Chinese coalition? Probably yes.
Is Pakistan non-aligned, US-aligned, or part of the Russian-Chinese coalition?
If Pakistan does not use its nuclear weapons, then India probably doesn’t either. Are either of them aligned with a faction or staying out of the conflict?
Are other nations part of the US nuclear sharing in your scenario, or have joined NATO? E.g., it is being talked about to include Poland in the US nuclear sharing, Sweden wants to join NATO; other nations also wish to join NATO (Georgia, Ukraine,…)
What is the state of European “strategic autonomy”? Have other nations joined the EU? Does the EU have an EU army? Does Germany have its own nuclear weapons, or does it receive more nuclear warheads for a “German nuclear umbrella”? “Europe needs a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, under NATO command. Only a trilateral British, French, and German nuclear umbrella, combined with a US umbrella, all under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) will be a credible deterrent for Russia.”
It would be important to consider which of the nuclearized nations would launch their nuclear warheads primarily against counterforce or countervalue targets.
1. Upon closer examination of US projections concerning the development, modernization, and expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, it becomes evident that historical US projections have frequently overestimated the expansion of the Chinese arsenal. “Evaluation of current US projections about the future size of China’s nuclear weapons stockpile must keep in mind earlier projections, some of which did not come to pass. During the 1980s and 1990s, US government agencies published several projections for the number of Chinese nuclear warheads. A US Defense Intelligence Agency study from 1984 inaccurately estimated that China had 150 to 360 nuclear warheads and projected it could increase to more than 800 by 1994. Over a decade later, another Defense Intelligence Agency study published in 1999 projected that China might have over 460 nuclear weapons by 2020. That projection also did not come true. When the Pentagon in 2020 finally publicly disclosed its estimate of the Chinese nuclear warhead inventory, it was less than half of what the Defense Intelligence Agency had projected two decades earlier: ‘in the low 200s’.” “With this record in mind, current US projections should be taken with a grain of salt. In April 2021 the commander of US Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, testified before Congress saying that China is ‘well ahead of the pace necessary to double their nuclear stockpile by the end of the decade’. A couple of months earlier, in January 2021, Richard wrote in US Naval Institute Proceedings that the Chinese stockpile could ‘triple or quadruple’ over the next decade. And in November 2021, the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress projected that China could have 700 deliverable warheads by 2027, and possibly as many as 1,000 by 2030.” “The 2022 Pentagon increased the projection even further, claiming that China’s stockpile of ‘operational’ nuclear warheads had surpassed 400 and will likely reach about 1,500 warheads by 2035.”
The US track record of overestimating the expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal leads me to believe that their current projections may be inflated.
Meanwhile, the Federation of American Scientists estimate trendline suggests that China will only have approximately 570 warheads by 2030, and approximately 750 warheads by 2035, which is approximately half of what the Pentagon predicts. 2. Considering advancements in other fields, it is plausible to assume, that the US, France, Italy, the UK, Germany, and Israel, among other nations, will have considerably improved their ABM systems by the end of the 2020s. Arrow 3 is the most advanced ABM system currently available, Israel has already started working on Arrow 4. For instance, in 2023 19 European states participate in the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, a project to build a ground-based integrated European air defense system that includes anti-ballistic missile capability, which is supposed to be finished by 2027. 3. In modern expansions or modernization of the nuclear arsenal nations tend to opt for nuclear warheads with yields ranging from 200 to 600 KT on average. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, China currently is reported to have only 6 nuclear warheads with MT yields (their yields range from 4 to 5 MT). 4. Under the assumption that China expands its nuclear arsenal in line with the Pentagon’s projections in contrast to their track record, why would other nations not expand theirs?
New START will expire in 2026, and neither France nor the UK are parties to New START. Further, there is a historical precedent as the UK has increased the cap on its nuclear stockpile to 260 due to the evolving security environment in 2021.
Are you referring to the real world or your scenario? Tensions are currently not low, but also not extremely high, diplomatic relations have, however, cooled. While China is practicing military drills, its activities currently cannot yet be compared to Russia’s military buildup of approximately 90,000 soldiers in December 2021, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
If you are referring to your scenario, then I would personally suggest emphasizing that tensions have been very high this month (e.g., increased readiness (significantly more than what we currently see) on Chinese bases in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait).
The US has the DEFCON, which is not publicly announced for security reasons. DEFCON 2 was reportedly reached only once (only for the SAC, the rest remained at DEFCON 3), during the Cuban Missile Crisis. DEFCON 3 was reportedly reached during the Yom Kippur War, Operation Paul Bunyan, and the 9/11 attacks. Other alert scales, however, exist for their designed purposes, e.g., REDCON, LERTCON, and EMERGCON.
“Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China has maintained a minimum nuclear deterrence posture and emphasized that a credible second-strike capability would be sufficient to deter an attack on China.” It should, however, be noted that China “is investing significant resources to ensure the survivability of the nuclear arsenal,” and constructing new silo fields (the Pentagon assesses this to indicate China’s intent to move to a launch-on-warning posture).
The Bulletin of the Automic Scientists states that “these data points, however, are not necessarily evidence of a shift to a more aggressive nuclear posture.”
Further, “the People’s Liberation Army (China’s principal military force) has maintained a ‘low alert level’ for its nuclear forces and keeps most of its warheads at its regional storage facilities and its central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range. The 2022 Pentagon report reaffirmed this posture, stating that China ‘almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a peacetime status—with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.’ But the report also described that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force brigades conduct ‘combat readiness duty’ and ‘high alert duty’ drills, which ‘apparently includes assigning a missile battalion to be ready to launch and rotating to standby positions as much as monthly for unspecified periods of time.’”
“The ‘moderate state of alert’ in peacetime might involve designated units to be deployed in high combat-ready condition with nuclear warheads in nearby storage sites under control of the Central Military Commission that could be released to the unit quickly if necessary.”
I understand why you currently would not share information concerning background information, however, that does not address the underlying issue. You could also disclose that in a private message if you’d prefer that.
Please correct me if I’m wrong, but I remember that in my playthrough nuclear missiles (from Russia, based on your statements) were striking targets in France before the US (and allies) launched their missiles directed at China; or, I don’t remember a previous mention that the US, and its allies have launched missiles targeting China.
I might be remembering this incorrectly, in which case I would apologize. Nonetheless, such a decision would seem rather strategically dubious on the part of Russia.
I appreciate that there will be ways to investigate and discover information regarding this, though I believe that it would be a sensible choice to include a subtle hint before the nuclear escalation that Russia would support China (e.g., Russia supporting China in the UN; increasing readiness), and to include in the news/text [I’d need to take a look at the specific page] (that Russia and China launched their nuclear weapons either concurrently, or that Russia only launched its nuclear weapons after some retaliatory strikes had already been launched on the part of the US and its allies.
Alternatively, either the US and its allies, or Russia could launch their nuclear weapons first, as none of them have a NFU policy. (This would also easily resolve the issue of China’s NFU policy, which we have previously discussed, as China’s NFU policy would be maintained since China would be retaliating.)
There are certainly reasons why nations may choose to launch all or most of their nuclear weapons, depending on their delivery systems, at once. However, it should be noted that many nations currently retain significant portions of their nuclear weapons in a non-deployed state, for instance, in stockpiles, or in a state that still requires them to be mated. Non-deployed nuclear warheads would need to be deployed to increase their readiness.
For a launch-on-warning posture nuclear warheads must be mated to their delivery system. 1. As you have correctly pointed out, ICBMs in hardened missile silos are susceptible to counterforce strikes (surface burst) as hardening comes at the price of concealment and missile accuracy has improved. An article published in the journal International Security improves our understanding of the survivability of nuclear forces.
“In 1985 a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had only about a 54 percent chance of destroying a missile silo hardened to withstand 3,000 pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure. In 2017 that figure exceeds 74 percent. The improvement in submarine-launched weapons is starker: from 9 percent to 80 percent (using the larger-yield W88 warhead). Figure 1 also suggests, however, that despite vast improvements in missile accuracy, the weapons still are not effective enough to be employed individually against hardened targets. Even modern ballistic missiles are expected to miss or fail 20–30 percent of the time.”
Further, the problem of fratricide is becoming less significant due to the advancements in accuracy.
“One type of fratricide occurs when the prompt effects of nuclear detonations— radiation, heat, and overpressure—destroy or deflect nearby warheads. To protect those warheads, targeters must separate the incoming weapons by at least 3–5 seconds. A second source of fratricide is harder to overcome. Destroying hard targets typically requires low-altitude detonations (so-called ground bursts), which vaporize material on the ground. When the debris begins to cool, 6–8 seconds after the detonation, it solidifies and forms a dust cloud that envelops the target. Even small dust particles can be lethal to incoming warheads speeding through the cloud to the target. Particles in the debris cloud take approximately 20 minutes to settle back to ground.”
“As figure 1 shows, the proportion of misses—the main culprit of fratricide—compared to hits is fading. To be clear, some weapons will still fail; that is, they will be prevented from destroying their targets because of malfunctioning missile boosters, faulty guidance systems, or defective warheads. Those kinds of failures, however, do not generally cause fratricide, because the warheads do not detonate near the target. Only those that miss—that is, those that travel to the target area and detonate outside the LR—will create a dust cloud that shields the target from other incoming weapons.”
The article notes concerning US missiles that “although 80 percent missile reliability is traditionally used as a baseline, much evidence suggests that the actual reliability of modern missiles exceeds 90 percent,” and that “the accuracy revolution has rendered low-casualty counterforce attacks plausible for the first time.”
According to Table 1, provided by the article, the US nuclear missiles have a probability of destroying each individual target of at least 93% under a 2:1 attack plan. 2. “Similarly, concealment comes at the price of hardening. If mobile forces are discovered, they tend to be easy to destroy. Concealment has another significant drawback: it is a “fail deadly” strategy, meaning that if an adversary develops a way to locate one’s forces, one’s arsenal might go from highly survivable to completely vulnerable almost overnight. Even worse, one might not know that the nuclear balance has shifted in such a calamitous manner. Some countries have adopted operating doctrines that attempt to capitalize on the advantages of both hardening and concealment: China today, for example, appears to plan to disperse its mobile missiles in a nuclear crisis from its peacetime garrisons to remote protective sites. Such approaches capture the benefits of both strategies, but they also pay the costs. For example, China’s strategy leaves its forces vulnerable if an attacker has identified its dispersal sites or detects mobile missiles in transit.” 3. The survivability of aircraft-launched nuclear weapons, e.g., cruise missiles and gravity bombs, is likely low for several reasons.
As you correctly described, counterforce strikes could target the respective air bases and weapon storage sites, thereby eliminating capabilities to retaliate using aircraft-launched nuclear weapons.
Cruise missiles have a shorter range, and further they are vulnerable to typical air-defense means, e.g., CAP and SAM.
Nuclear bombers could also be intercepted and shot down by other aircraft. 4. Further, “SSBNs have never been as invulnerable as analysts typically assume, and advances in remote sensing appear to be reducing the survivability.”
“The core of U.S. ASW efforts against the Soviet Union lay in a series of breakthroughs in passive sonar and signals processing, as well as doctrine and tactics to exploit those advances. Starting in the 1950s, the United States deployed an expanding network of underwater hydrophones designed to identify and locate adversary submarines. Data from the hydrophones were transmitted across undersea cables to onshore computing facilities, where powerful computers discerned the faint sounds of submarines from ocean noise. Potential targets were then passed along to aircraft and attack submarines (SSNs) for further location and tracking. U.S. capabilities to track Soviet submarines leapt forward in the late 1960s and 1970s, as the United States deployed new attack submarines, which were equipped with powerful sonars in their bows, towed sonar arrays, and improved on-ship computing power, giving U.S. SSNs an unprecedented combination of acoustic gathering and data processing capabilities.
The competition between Soviet SSBNs and the pack of U.S. submarines, aircraft, and surface ships hunting them varied throughout the Cold War. There were periods in which U.S. forces were winning, trailing every Soviet SSBN on patrol, from port to sea and back. In later periods, after discovering their vulnerability, the Russians pulled their forces into protected “bastions” near Soviet territory to counter the U.S. ASW strategy. The United States did not give up, and worked until the end of the Cold War (and beyond) to regain undersea superiority.
The duration of U.S. Cold War ASW superiority cannot be accurately assessed today because of enduring classification constraints. But for periods of the superpower competition, U.S. naval leaders believed they had the ASW problem well in hand. As the former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the mid-1980s remarked, the United States was able to ‘identify by hull number the identity of Soviet subs … and know exactly where they were. In port or at sea. If they were at sea, N3 [director for operations] had an SSN [on them].’
There are three key lessons to draw from the Cold War ASW competition. First, previous advances in remote sensing greatly increased the vulnerability of deployed submarines.70 Second, escaping vulnerability was no easy task. In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union learned that its submarines were vulnerable. But despite Moscow’s significant economic and technological resources, it took the Soviet navy more than a decade to develop good countermeasures against the evolving U.S. ASW capabilities.
Third, and most broadly, the Cold War ASW competition demonstrates that the deployment of ballistic missile submarines neither ended the Cold War nuclear competition nor negated hopes on either side of attaining military superiority. The United States led the undersea competition for a time because of its superior technology and tactics; the Soviet Union developed countermeasures because it discovered its vulnerabilities and innovated. This back-and-forth struggle between hiders and seekers looks more like a traditional struggle for naval superiority than the common depiction of invulnerable submarines.
Today’s technological advances in remote sensing, data processing, and communication are occurring at a rapid pace, and their ultimate impact on the submarine competition is too uncertain to predict with confidence (especially given the tight controls over information on contemporary ASW capabilities). Yet, there are good reasons to suspect that the dramatic leaps in remote sensing are increasing the transparency of the seas and undermining the ability of submarines to remain concealed.”
In light of this, it would be highly dependent on nations’ capabilities in remote sensing and ASW as to whether they choose to retain their SLBMs for future strikes. Further, as aforementioned, for several nations (e.g., the UK and China), rapid deployment of a majority of their nuclear weapons may not currently be feasible, which is why I would again suggest putting more emphasis in your story on the fact that tensions have been extremely high leading up to the events, which makes it more likely for countries to have increased their readiness.
(Someone else needs to post first as I can only send 2 messages at a time, and the total message is over 111000 characters.)
Using the more reliable data provided by the FAS estimate trendline, China will have only 570 nuclear warheads by 2030, not 700 to 900; for the sake of the following calculations and considerations, it will be assumed that China will have 600 nuclear warheads by 2030. We should further assume that China and Russia would follow the 2:1 attack plan for counterforce targets as the reliability of their delivery systems is likely lower when compared with the delivery systems of the US. 1. Further, we need to consider the delivery systems and structure of each nation’s current nuclear arsenal and its constraints. 1.1 China:
China is currently investing in the expansion of its nuclear missile silos. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that a high percentage of its future nuclear weapons will be ICBMs. Further, China is developing air-launched ballistic missiles with capabilities for nuclear warheads, likely with a range of 3000 km.
Current Arsenal:
Land-based ballistic missiles:
Medium-range ballistic missiles: 24 warheads (the DF21 CSS-5 has a range of 2150 km) (+ unknown number of HGVs which may potentially carry nuclear warheads, however, the HGVs have only been deployed since 2021, reported range of 1800 - 2500 km)
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles: 54 warheads (the delivery system DF-26 has a range of 4000 km)
ICBMs: 240 warheads (6 DF5 12000 km range for the 6 4-5 MT nuclear warheads, 12 DF5 13000 km range capable of carrying 5 warheads, DF31 (6 with 7200 km range, 84 with 11200 km range), 28 DF41 capable of carrying 3 warheads with a range of 12000 - 15000 km.
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles: 72 warheads (the SLBMs are reported to have a range of 9000-10000 km, likely capable of carrying 3 warheads)
Aircraft: 10 gravity bombs, 10 air-launched ballistic missiles (range: 3000km) (the aircraft H6 has a combat radius of 3500 km)
Based on the current arsenal, and the Chinese expansion of its missile silos, I would suggest that China will have 30 MRBMs, 65 IRBMs, 30 aircraft-launched nuclear weapons, 108 warheads on SLBMs, and 367 warheads on ICBMs by 2030.
If the Chinese submarines were stationed in the Taiwan Strait, the SLBMs would not be able to reach most of the continental US (only the state of Washington (possibly Seattle, Seattle may potentially be too far), and Alaska), if stationed in the South China Sea only Alaska. To target more of the continental US they would either need to be launched from the Yellow Sea (capable of reaching San Diego, Denver, and Minneapolis, but not Chicago), or farther in the Pacific (though the US naval presence and military bases could make this unlikely; if they were to launch close from Russia’s Kamchatka they could target the entire continental US).
China’s aircraft and ALBMs are not capable of reaching the continental US, except potentially Alaska, and US military bases in non-continental Guam. The H20 aircraft, deployment likely to start by 2028, is projected to have a range of approximately 8500 km.
The ranges of the MRBMs and IRBMs are too short to reach the continental US, MRBMs may target Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and US military bases in the Philippines and Malaysia, the IRBMs may also additionally target Guam.
Assuming an expansion of the Chinese ICBMs based on their current data, China may have approximately 185 ICBMs for 367 warheads, with approximately two warheads per ICBM.
If China launched its SLBMs from the Yellow Sea or Near Kamchatka, and all Chinese ICBMs were targeting the US, then approximately 475 nuclear warheads would be on delivery systems capable of targeting the continental US. Even in a scenario where China had 650 nuclear warheads on delivery systems (ICBMs or SLBMs) capable of reaching the continental US, following a 2:1 attack plan China would only be able to strike 325 targets in the US.
If China’s ICBMs and SLBMs had a success rate of 90%, and 80% respectively (almost as high as the US’s, unlikely), and further assuming that China’s SLBMs can carry up to 3 warheads, then 167 out of 184 ICBMs would successfully deliver their warheads, destroying 167 targets, and 32 out of 36 SLBMs would successfully deliver their warheads, destroying approximately 49 targets; for 650 nuclear warheads, assuming the same ratio of ICBMs to SLBMs, ICBMs would successfully deliver warheads to and destroy 230 out of 256 targets, and SLBMs would successfully deliver warheads to and destroy 62 out of 69 targets.
This disregards any potential ABM systems that the US, Japan, and South Korea may have in place, and also disregards the US’s ASW capabilities.
Further, it could prove difficult for Chinese aircraft to reach Japan, South Korea, the US, and other targets in the Pacific region without being intercepted and shot down due to the extent of each nation’s air force and their air-defense systems.
Ukraine has claimed to have shot down a Russian hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile using the US Patriot system (SAM, can counter aircraft and missiles), Japan and South Korea both have Patriot systems. Further, Japan and South Korea have the US THAAD, designed to counter SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. Further, Japan has the Aegis BMD, designed to counter IRBMs.
1.2 Russia:
ICBMs: 874 warheads (on approximately 315 ICBMs, with a range of 10000 to 18000 km (depending on type), and an average of 2.77 warheads per ICBM)
SLBMs: 640 warheads (256 warheads on 64 SS-N-23 M2/3 (4 warheads each) with a range of 8300 km, and 384 warheads on 64 SS-N-32 (6 warheads each) with a range of 8300 km) (Likely SSBNs carrying the SLBMs are assigned to Russia’s northern fleet (Kola) and/or the pacific fleet (Kamchatka).)
Aircraft-launched nuclear weapons: 200 warheads (Bear-H6/16 aircraft has a range of 15000 km, but a relatively low speed of 925 km/h and can be equipped with 6 to 16 ALCMs each, 13 Tu-160/M aircraft with a range of 12300 km and a cruise speed of 960 km/h, they can be equipped with 12 ALCMs each.) NATO has previously intercepted Russian nuclear bombers. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists “estimate[s] that given the sizes of the nuclear storage bunkers, roughly 200 are stored at Russia’s two strategic bomber bases—Engels in Saratov oblast and Ukrainka in Amur oblast—and the rest are thought to be in central storage.”
Russia also possesses nonstrategic nuclear weapons, however, those are thought to be in central storage.
Based on the information Russia is likely able to target any target in the northern hemisphere, though their bombers may be vulnerable to SAM and CAP. Assuming a success rate of 90%, then 283 of 315 ICBMs, 115 of 128 SLBMs, and 180 of 200 ALCMs would deliver in total ~1538 warheads, thereby successfully destroying 769 targets.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists states that “Russia’s nuclear modernization program appears motivated in part by the Kremlin’s strong desire to maintain overall parity with the United States and to maintain national prestige, but also to compensate for inferior conventional forces as well as the Russian leadership’s apparent conviction that the US ballistic missile defense system constitutes a real future risk to the credibility of Russia’s retaliatory capability. The poor performance of Russian conventional forces in the war against Ukraine and depletion of weapon stockpiles will likely deepen Russian reliance on nuclear weapons for its national defense. Throughout its war in Ukraine, Russia has conducted a series of missile strikes using long-range dual-capable precision weapons, such as Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched 3 M–54 Kalibr cruise missiles, 9-A-7760 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, and ground-launched Iskander missiles. Additionally, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense has released several intelligence reports identifying that Russia has used unarmed munitions and aging cruise missiles without nuclear warheads in Ukraine, including the Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent). Russian forces have also repurposed anti-ship missiles and missile defense systems including the S-300 for ground-strike capabilities, which some analysts assume to be another sign that Russia’s longer-range weapons stockpile is dwindling as the length of the war drags on.”
Concerning New START and capabilities to deploy warheads in stockpiles, the Bulletin expressed that
if Russia decided to exceed the treaty’s limits, it could theoretically upload hundreds of warheads onto its deployed delivery systems, possibly increasing its deployed nuclear arsenal by about 60 percent. How quickly this could be done depends largely upon the weapon system: Bombers could be uploaded in a matter of hours or days, whereas a complete upload of the submarines and ICBMs could take months or even years given the time it takes to return submarines to port and change the warhead configuration on each ICBM."
They further describe Russia’s efforts to develop the Poseidon, a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo that a Russian government document described as intended to create “areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for long periods of time," scheduled for delivery in 2027. “Putin characterized the torpedo as ‘a new type of strategic weapon that would carry massive nuclear ordnance,’ but also commented that ‘unmanned underwater vehicles’ such as Poseidon ‘can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, which enables them to engage various targets, including aircraft carrier groups, coastal fortifications, and infrastructure.’ Some Russian analysts have suggested that Poseidon really is a ‘multipurpose system’ and that delivering high-yield warheads is not its primary application. Indeed, it may not even be a “weapon” in the conventional sense, but rather a compact and fast autonomous submarine capable of a wide range of missions including reconnaissance and conventional strike.
The following excerpt is from EuroNews:
" Defence experts say that based on what’s known about the weapon and its dimensions, the yield of Poseidon’s nuclear warhead could be as high as 2 megatons - a figure repeatedly reported by the Russian TASS news agency in recent years.[…]
However, the three experts Euronews Next spoke to all cast serious doubts on the claim made by Russian TV anchor Kiselyov that Poseidon’s warhead packed a yield of 100 megatons.
Hambling called the claim ‘simply insane - that would be the biggest warhead ever deployed’.
‘I mean, with the current Russian regime, who knows? It’s possible that they might have the hubris to build something like that, but it certainly is grotesquely gigantic,’ he said.
‘The explosion of this torpedo near the British coast will cause a giant tsunami wave up to 500 metres high,’ Kiselyov warned in his May 1 primetime show.
He added that ‘the wave would also carry extreme doses of radiation and after its passage over Great Britain leave a radioactive desert, unfit for anything for a long time’.
Kiselyov’s comments were illustrated by an animation of the giant torpedo, a massive menacing wave, and of the UK and Ireland being wiped off the map.
The experts Euronews Next spoke to said the threat was in no way realistic.
‘We know that from quite a lot of work which was actually done again back in the crazy days of the Cold War about doing this very thing, and creating tsunamis with nuclear weapons,’ Hambling said.
'It turns out you need a vast amount of energy to do that - even more than you can get out of a nuclear blast,” he explained, noting that earthquakes fared much better at causing tsunamis.
‘If it’s moved into a harbour and detonated very close offshore, it would certainly be able to destroy a city. But it probably wouldn’t damage much beyond that, and it certainly wouldn’t do as much damage as a large nuclear airburst,’ Hambling added."
1.3 United States
ICBMs: 400 warheads (LGM-30G Minuteman III, range 14000 km, approximately 1 warhead per missile, 450 ICBM launch facilities, split across three wings: the 90th Missile Wing at F. E. Warren Air Force Base in Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming; the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota; and the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. In addition to the 400 silos with missiles, another 50 silos are kept “warm” to load stored missiles if necessary.)
SLBMs: 1000 warheads (UGM-133A Trident II D5/LE, 7600 to 13500 km range, depending on the number of warheads (3-8, except for 25 W76-2 nuclear warheads with either one or two) on an SLBM; carried by 14 SSBNs with 20 SLBMs per submarine, otherwise approximately 3.48 warheads per SLBM.) (The US Navy operates a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), of which eight operate in the Pacific from their base near Bangor, Washington, and six operate in the Atlantic from their base at Kings Bay, Georgia.)
Warheads delivered by aircraft: 300 warheads at bomber bases (An estimated 200 ALCMs at Minot Air Force Base (North Dakota) and approximately 100 bombs at Whiteman Air Force Base (Missouri). The remaining weapons are in long-term storage.) (The successor to B2 (stealth bomber) is expected to enter service by 2027.)
Assuming a success rate of 93% for the US’s ICBMs and 96% for SLBMs based on available data (for hard targets with 2 hits), and assuming a success rate of 90% for aircraft, then the US would be able to successfully destroy 801 targets.
1.4 France
SLBMs: 240 warheads (4-6 warheads per SLBM, estimated range of 9000 to 10000 km, SSBNs based at Île Longue near Brest, an SSBN can carry 16 SLBMs, 3 in service, 1 undergoing routine maintenance)
Aircraft: 50 warheads (Rafale BF, 1850 km range, can achieve high speeds, 10 are launched from carrier aircraft, “given the Rafales’ relatively short range, France’s air-launched nuclear weapons capability depends on a support fleet of refueling aircraft. France currently operates a mixed fleet of Boeing C−135FR and KC−135 R tanker aircraft.” Refueling would be required to strike major Russian cities.)
"Until 2009, management and storage of France’s air-launched nuclear weapons was conducted by Dépôts-Ateliers de Munitions Spéciales (DAMS) located at Saint-Dizier, Istres, and Avord Air Bases. In 2009, these three bases were adapted for ASMPA storage and renamed to “K Buildings”. Although nuclear-capable Rafales operated by the Strategic Air Forces are all located at Saint-Dizier, all three bases serve as dispersal and storage sites. Moreover, Avord, Istres, or both are thought to serve as storage sites for the ASMPAs assigned to the Charles de Gaulle for the Naval Nuclear Aviation Force strike mission.
With refueling the French aircraft may feasibly target targets in western Russia. Depending on where the SSBNs are stationed (e.g. Mediterranean, North Sea, Bay of Biscaya), France could feasibly target any location in Russia and China. Assuming a success rate of 90%, France would be able to successfully destroy 108 such targets using SLBMs, as well as 45 targets in western Russia using aircraft and their delivery system.
1.5 United Kingdom
SLBMs: 225 warheads (Like the US, the UK uses Trident II D5(LE), in 2021 120 of those were operationally available) (The 4 SSBNs can be equipped with 16 SLBMs each, with 1 to 8 warheads per SLBM, likely approximately 3 to 3.5.)
The UK’s SSBNs are ported at Naval Base Clyde in Scotland. With a 96% success rate, the UK may be able to successfully destroy 101 out of 113 targets assuming a 2:1 attack plan.
“The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent relies heavily on American nuclear infrastructure, to the point where its own independence has long been in question. The United Kingdom does not own its own missiles, but has title to 58 Trident SLBMs from a pool of missiles shared with the United States Navy. The UK Government is also participating in the US Navy’s current program to extend the service life of the Trident II D5 (the life-extended version will be known as D5LE) missile to the early 2060s. Additionally, the current UK warhead, which is called Holbrook, is believed to be highly similar to the United States’ W76-0 warhead – so similar that it has appeared in the US Department of Energy’s ‘W76 Needs’ maintenance schedule.”
2. Targets 2.1 The United States: reported to have 450 missile silos; 2 nuclear aircraft bases; 2 SSBN bases; approximately 24 storage sites (the location with the most nuclear weapons by far is the large Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex south of Albuquerque, New Mexico; Most of the weapons in this location are retired weapons awaiting dismantlement at the Pantex Plant in Texas; The state with the second-largest inventory is Washington, which is home to the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific and the ballistic missile submarines at Naval Submarine Base Kitsap (Washington is the state with most nuclear weapons if counting only stockpiled weapons)); according to a report, the U.S. had about 750 military bases overseas, across 80 countries in the world and had deployed 173,000 troops in 159 different countries as of July 2021, Japan has the highest number of overseas military bases of the U.S. with 120 bases, followed by Germany and South Korea at second and third, with 119 and 73 bases respectively; the 21 major sites of the GMD; potentially could include 93 operating commercial nuclear reactors at 54 nuclear power plants in 28 states; the major combattant [command structure (Unified combatant command - Wikipedia) sites and support agencies (there are many, I couldn’t find a concrete number, as there are many different components to this, I assume at least several hundred potential targets); as well as other military sites of the US itself which have not yet been addressed; and then also countervalue targets (cities and civilian populations).
There are 109 metropolitan statistical areas in the US with a population of more than 500000 people, some of those regions are quite large, rendering one singular target insufficient to achieve the objectives.
Of course, there will be some overlap between some of the potential targets, however, the US is an incredibly large nation, as previously mentioned surface burst detonations would likely be used for counterforce targets and airburst detonations for counter-value targets. Further, as high-yield (more than 1 MT) nuclear weapons are largely becoming a thing of the past due to improved accuracy and reliability, the area that may potentially be affected by a nuclear detonation has decreased.
For my following calculations, I will arbitrarily assume that one-third of potential targets would be included by targeting other potential targets, reducing redundancies, and assume that there are 500 major command structure targets.
My results, only for the US are:
a) 761 (1141) targets excluding foreign military bases
b) 1261 (1891) targets including all foreign military bases
To reliably destroy counterforce targets with a success rate of over 90%, Russia and China would likely need to follow the previously described 2:1 attack plan, though countervalue targets may follow a 1.5:1 attack plan to reflect their non-military target status and the large area of some metropolitan statistical areas (Note: this likely would not irreparably damage the entire metropolitan statistical area in most cases due to lower-yield nuclear warheads and the US’s lower population densities when compared to major European cities and major Cities in East Asia.
For this calculation, we shall define the metropolitan statistical areas as countervalue targets.
What this implies:
a) 164 nuclear warheads must be used to destroy the 109 major metropolitan statistical areas, and 1304 nuclear warheads to further destroy the counterforce targets successfully, total: 1468 warheads
b) 164 nuclear warheads must be used to destroy the 109 major metropolitan statistical areas, and 2304 nuclear warheads to further destroy the additional defined counterforce targets successfully, total: 2468 warheads
This does not yet consider ABM, SAM, and CAP capabilities that could increase the required numbers considerably nor non-US targets in US allies, which plausibly could increase the required number to destroy more than 90% of the targets successfully to upwards of 3500.
A prerequisite for this is that the Chinese-Russian faction carry out their targeting in a coordinated manner (with each nation focusing on certain targets). Further, following the FAS estimate trendline of 570 Chinese nuclear warheads by 2030, and then adding the deployed Russian arsenal of 1674 warheads, we get a total of 2244 warheads, even in the scenario I previously outlined where China’s expands its arsenal more rapidly, it still only yields a total of approximately 2419 warheads.
Consequently, China and Russia may need to opt for a different attack plan or reduce the number of targets. One could argue that nations would likely launch their ICBMs and aircraft-based nuclear weapons, thereby eradicating the need to target such targets. This could, however, prove costly, if the assumption turns out to be false, and the US retained significant amounts of its ICBMs, which would allow them to continue to strike China and Russia while they would have already exhausted their nuclear arsenals.
Therefore, I believe it would be more likely for them to exclude other potential targets, for example, certain nuclear facilities.
Some have provided context concerning the potential of nuclear weapons to destroy nuclear reactors, I’d like to emphasize that environmentalist movements and political parties like the German Greens often still claim and argue that nuclear energy is high-risk despite evidence that highly indicates the contrary. Nuclear energy is one of the safest and cleanest sources of energy that exist. “You need a megaton weapon to do that and megaton weapons are no longer found in the USA or Russian strategic weapons. There are however two situations that make a nuclear power facility a huge nightmare. This is why targeting such in a time of war is a violation of the Geneva Convention and the LOAC. It is also why Russia and the US maintain an informal agreement to never target nuclear power facilities in a time of war.” “It is the worst possible outcome in any nuclear weapons use.” “A nuclear bomb’s residual radiation has dropped to near zero in a few months whereas the byproducts found in spent nuclear fuel will remain dangerous for thousands of years.”
Russia and China also might not target minor US military bases abroad, especially if they are in NWFZs. Further, they could opt for a different attack plan, etc.
As a result of Russia and China having to be more selective concerning their choice of targets (from the US and its allies), as well as advancements in countermeasures, it becomes quite unclear if even such a large-scale nuclear attack (in line with their arsenals) would be sufficient in the decapitation of the US and its allies. As long as a command structure, sufficient military forces loyal to the government, other government bodies, and support agencies exist, it seems rather peculiar to me to refer to that as “decapitation”.
Other considerations are:
the Russo-Ukrainian War: Donald Tusk, the new Polish PM, has called for the full mobilization of the West; further Russia must dedicate significant industry capabilities towards the Russo-Ukrainian War, thereby other components, such as the maintenance of nuclear weapons and facilities may not be the priority, resulting in less nuclear capabilities
if China were to expand its nuclear arsenal rapidly (Pentagon projections), then Western nations, such as France, the UK, and possibly Germany, could take measures to either expand their nuclear arsenal or develop one (Germany).
the US and its allies appear to have better remote sensing and accuracy than China and Russia
ABM systems are being advanced primarily in Western nations, e.g., Arrow 4 (which is being designed to target hypersonic threats), and NGI (next-generation interceptor) to be fielded by 2027/2028)
“But the Nuclear War Simulator produces some pretty believable numbers in terms of fatalities and other destruction effects, so it’s pretty believable in this regard as well.”
Are the numbers realistic or believable? There’s a difference in meaning. Further, assuming that another part is “believable” based upon the believability of other parameters, ignores the burden of proof for that respective part.
The issue is indeed complex, but its contradictions often stem from other problems. Most studies concerning nuclear winter and the consequences of nuclear war either are outdated, rely on outdated studies and data, or are flawed in their methodology. They often tend to make assumptions about the amount of soot injected by nuclear detonations into the stratosphere that contradict recent findings or assume that a certain amount of soot has been caused and is in the stratosphere. This, however, ignores that the debris must reach the stratosphere and the requirements for that to occur. The bombs deployed today will throw debris up only 50,000 - 60,000 feet into the atmosphere and will rain back down to the earth hours and days later near the point of detonation, thereby not reaching the stratosphere.
For instance, an article published in 2022 establishes that “an idealized dry plume requires a temperature anomaly of at least 60 K at the top of the boundary-layer to remain buoyant up to the cold-point tropopause. Direct numerical and large-eddy simulations indicate that dry firestorm plumes possess temperature anomalies that are less than the requirements for stratospheric ascent by a factor of two or more. In contrast, moist firestorm plumes are shown to reach the stratosphere by tapping into the abundant latent heat present in a moist environment. Latent heating is found to be essential to plume rise, raising doubts about the applicability of past work that neglected moisture.”
"Unlike the highly combustible World War II cities that firestormed from conventional and nuclear weapons, a FEMA report suggests that due to the nature of modern U.S. city design and construction, a firestorm is unlikely to occur even after a nuclear detonation because highrise buildings do not lend themselves to the formation of firestorms because of the baffle effect of the structures, and firestorms are unlikely in areas whose modern buildings have totally collapsed, with the exceptions of Tokyo and Hiroshima, because of the nature of their densely-packed “flimsy” wooden buildings in World War II.
There is also a sizable difference between the fuel loading of World War II cities that firestormed and that of modern cities, where the quantity of combustibles per square meter in the fire area in the latter is below the necessary requirement for a firestorm to form (40 kg/m2). Therefore, firestorms are not to be expected in modern North American cities after a nuclear detonation, and are expected to be unlikely in modern European cities."
Similarly, I would assume modern city design and construction in China and other nations’ metropolitan areas to have fewer combustibles per square meter than the necessary requirement for a firestorm to form.
In a 2011 article by Russell Seitz who served as an Associate of The Center for International Affairs and a Fellow of the Department of Physics at Harvard, he states that "Alan Robock’s contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the ‘nuclear winter’ concept is itself debatable. This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models, have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling.
Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens”. Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory”.
Robock’s single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term ‘nuclear winter’ into question."
While it is true that some soot may reach the stratosphere (which it would need to, reaching the troposphere would be insufficient), notions of a “nuclear winter” need to be called into question due to the lack of high-yield nuclear weapons in modern nuclear arsenals and recent findings concerning firestorms and soot reaching the stratosphere.
Further, the timescale for the removal of soot from the stratosphere is important to consider.
For historical context, we should consider the events of 1990/1991 in Iraq.
"The nuclear winter theory relies heavily on the worst case scenario of many of the events that would unfold during a nuclear exchange and as such exaggerates the effect dramatically. A contemporary example of prediction not accurately modeling reality is the forecast effects of the Iraqis setting 300 oil rigs ablaze in 1991.
Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Iraqi threats of igniting the country’s 800 or so oil wells were made, speculation on the cumulative climatic effect of this, presented at the World Climate Conference in Geneva that November in 1990, ranged from a nuclear winter type scenario, to heavy acid rain and even short term immediate global warming. As threatened, the wells were set ablaze by the retreating Iraqis by March 1991 and the 600 or so successfully set Kuwaiti oil wells were not fully extinguished until November 6, 1991, eight months after the end of the war, and they consumed an estimated six million barrels of oil daily at their peak intensity. In articles printed in the Wilmington morning star and the Baltimore Sun newspapers of January 1991, prominent authors of nuclear winter papers — Richard P. Turco, John W. Birks, Carl Sagan, Alan Robock and Paul Crutzen —together collectively stated that they expected catastrophic nuclear winter like effects with continental-sized effects of “sub-freezing” temperatures as a result of the Iraqis going through with their threats of igniting 300 to 500 pressurized oil wells that could subsequently burn for several months.
Carl Sagan later conceded in his book The Demon-Haunted World that his predictions obviously did not turn out to be correct: “it was pitch black at noon and temperatures dropped 4–6 °C over the Persian Gulf, but not much smoke reached stratospheric altitudes and Asia was spared.”
An article from 2022 offers new insight concerning the removal timescales based on the 2017 Canadian and 2019/2020 Australian mega-fires.
“The 2017 Canadian megafire generated four large Pyrocumulonimbi (pyroCbs), injecting up to ≈0.3 Tg of smoke in the lower stratosphere. Even more extreme, the 2019/2020 Australian event produced a pyroCb activity resulting in stratospheric smoke intrusions of ≈1 Tg. To understand their contrasting behavior, we present global climate simulations of the atmospheric response to these events, applying smoke burdens informed by remote observations. Model outcomes, compared to satellite data of smoke transport, reproduce reasonably well the initial plume rise, at 0.2–0.3 km/day, attaining heights of ≈20 km in Canada and above 30 km in Australia. Global dispersal of the plume occurs within about 3 weeks in both cases, consistent with observations. Smoke removal timescales, ≈5 months for the Canadian megafire, agree with remote measurements. During the Australian megafire, observations indicate stratospheric injections three times as large, and models predict comparatively longer smoke lifetimes, ≈16 months.”
“In the first 6 months after the [Australian megafires], temperature anomalies point to cooling at values of (negative) 0.1–0.2 K.” In accord with observations, models predict regional cooling in the Southern Hemisphere, peaking in February 2020, when the net solar flux at surface lowered on average by ≈3 W/m2."
“For a 25% increase of the initial aerosol burden (from 0.8 to 1 Tg), the e-folding timescale increases by ≈15%.” E-folding time can be used to refer to exponential decay, specifically to refer to the timescale for a quantity to decrease to 1/e of its previous value.
As soot from nuclear weapons with yields under 1 MT is unlikely to reach the stratosphere, especially when targeting modern American and European cities where firestorms are unlikely to occur, and the number of high-yield nuclear weapons is very low, it remains unlikely for a nuclear winter to occur.
The findings from recent megafires indicate that the removal timescale for soot increases non-linearly, however, the cooling effects from the Australian megafires remained limited in both, time and scale.
Recent findings suggest that nuclear detonations in modern urban areas in North America and Europe are unlikely to cause firestorms and soot that can reach the stratosphere, making it unlikely that sufficient soot would reach the stratosphere to cause a nuclear winter. Similarly, nuclear detonations in modern urban areas in, e.g., China, South Korea, and Japan would also be unlikely to cause firestorms and soot that can reach the stratosphere.
Considering the few nuclear weapons with MT yields, acknowledging the findings of the recent evaluation of the Canadian and Australian megafires, the potential amount of soot that would reach the stratosphere is unlikely to be in the range of what would be required to cause what is understood as “nuclear winter.” Models relying on worst-case scenarios and outdated data have often assumed 150 - 180 Tg of soot to be caused by a large-scale nuclear war, but usually at least 100 Tg. Current findings, however, indicate that significantly lower amounts of soot would reach the stratosphere.
It has been argued that in a limited nuclear war between Pakistan and India where 100 nuclear weapons are used 5 Tg of soot may be injected into the stratosphere. This could be plausible despite them not having MT nuclear weapons upon considering India’s and Pakistan’s significantly lower HDI (human development index), their significantly lower HDI (when compared with China (especially their modern urban areas), Russia, Japan, South Korea, Europe, and the US) could potentially correlate with city design and construction that may have sufficient combustibles per square meter to commonly cause firestorms and also soot injection into the atmosphere.
Considerations before I attempt to calculate the soot injected into the atmosphere (based on previous calculations):
1. 1055 successful target destructions caused by the USA, UK, and France (assuming the previously established generalized 2:1 attack plan, based on current arsenals);
2.A (Version 1): 1063 successful target destructions caused by Russia and China (under the assumption of: a Chinese nuclear arsenal in line with the FAS estimate trendline by 2030 (570 warheads), a 2:1 attack plan for counterforce targets, a 1.5:1 attack plan for countervalue targets, the 109 countervalue targets in the US + an additional 141 countervalue targets outside the US, and Russia’s current arsenal; for easier calculation, a 90% success rate is assumed without further consideration of each component’s specific success rate)
2.B (Version 2): 1151 successful target destructions caused by Russia and China (under the assumption of: a larger Chinese nuclear arsenal not in line with the FAS estimate trendline by 2030 (~750 warheads), a 2:1 attack plan for counterforce targets, a 1.5:1 attack plan for countervalue targets, the 109 countervalue targets in the US + an additional 141 countervalue targets outside the US, and Russia’s current arsenal; for easier calculation, a 90% success rate is assumed without further consideration of each component’s specific success rate)
3. The 6 5 MT nuclear warheads of China target 6 major cities with a 100% success rate with a 1:1 attack plan, and cause firestorms and soot injections into the stratosphere of 1 Tg each (despite it being unlikely for firestorms to occur in western cities and the relatively low number of combustibles) (3 targets will be deducted from the successful target destructions as described in 2. respectively)
4. Assuming that 20% (Version A, Version B: 30%, Version C: 40%, Version D: 50%) of targets in Russia and China (targeted by the US faction) cause soot injection (based on their lower HDI when compared to the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea) into the stratosphere at a ratio of 0.05 Tg per target (based on the 5 Tg for 100 nuclear weapons in the Pakistan-India nuclear war scenario) (despite the lack of MT weapons being used)
5. Assuming that 5% (Version A, Version B: 10%, Version C: 15%, Version D: 20%) of the detonations at locations (because of their higher HDI) targeted by the Russian-Chinese faction cause soot injection into the stratosphere at a ratio of 0.05 Tg per target
Results: Version 1A: 19.2 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 10.55 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 2.65 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 1B: 27.13 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 15.83 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 5.3 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 1C: 35.05 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 21.1 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 7.95 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 1D: 42.98 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 26.38 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 10.6 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 2A: 19.42 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 10.55 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 2.87 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 2B: 27.57 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 15.83 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 5.74 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 2C: 35.71 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 21.1 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 8.61 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies) Version 2D: 43.86 Tg soot in the stratosphere (6 Tg caused by 6 Chinese MT weapons, 26.38 Tg caused by the US faction (targeting Russia and China), 11.48 Tg caused by the Chinese-Russian faction (targeting the US and allies)
Further considerations for additional targets and calculations for other scenarios: 1. These calculations have to an extent disregarded that MT yields are unlikely to cause debris to reach the stratosphere, relying largely on potential firestorms, which due to modern city design and construction are unlikely to occur in the US and Europe, and also unlikely in other nations with similarly developed cites. The next calculations will make similar assumptions.
2. Pakistan targets India with an 80% success rate following a 1:1 attack plan with: a) its estimated 170 warheads (causing 6.8 Tg of soot to be injected into the stratosphere) b) a higher number of 250 warheads (causing 10 Tg of soot to be injected into the stratosphere)
3. India targets with an 80% success rate, following a 1:1 attack plan: 3.1 Pakistan with: a) its estimated 164 warheads (causing 6.56 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) a higher number of 250 warheads (causing 10 Tg of soot to be injected into the stratosphere) c) an even higher number of 400 warheads developed in response to the expansion of the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear arsenals (causing 16 Tg of soot to be injected into the stratosphere) 3.2 Pakistan and China (at a ratio of 50/50) with: a) its estimated 164 warheads (causing A: 3.94 Tg, B: 4.26 Tg, C: 4.59 Tg, D: 4.92 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) a higher number of 250 warheads (causing A: 6 Tg, B: 6.5 Tg, C: 7 Tg, D: 7.5 TG of soot to be injected into the stratosphere) c) an even higher number of 400 warheads developed in response to the expansion of the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear arsenals (causing A: 9.6 Tg, B: 10.4 Tg, C: 11.2 Tg, D: 12 Tg of soot to be injected into the stratosphere)
4. North Korea targets Japan and South Korea with a success rate of 80% (probably lower) and a 1:1 attack plan with: a) its estimated 30 warheads (causing A: 0.06 Tg, B: 0.12 Tg, C: 0.18 Tg, D: 0.24 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) a higher number of 50 warheads (causing A: 0.1 Tg, B: 0.2 Tg, C: 0.3 Tg, D: 0.4 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere)
5. Israel is part of the US-led faction with a success rate of 90% (based on Israel’s generally more advanced missile systems compared to some other nations) following a 1:1 attack plan, targeting: 5.1 Russia, China (could with current max. range of 4500 km not reach a large majority of potential targets, however, by 2030 Israel could plausibly have a higher range), Iran, and nations with similar levels of development a) with its estimated (estimated number of warheads varies, likeliest current number) 90 nuclear warheads (causing A: 0.81 Tg, B: 1.22 Tg, C: 1.62 Tg, D: 2.03 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) with 150 nuclear warheads (causing A: 1.35 Tg, B: 2.03 Tg, C: 2.7 Tg, D: 3.38 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) with 250 nuclear warheads (causing A: 2.25 Tg, B: 3.38 Tg, C: 4.5 Tg, D: 5.63 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) with 400 (highest estimated number, highly unlikely) nuclear warheads (causing A: 3.6 Tg, B: 5.4 Tg, C: 7.2 Tg, D: 9 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 5.2 80% Russia, China (could with current max. range of 4500 km not reach a large majority of potential targets, however, by 2030 Israel could plausibly have a higher range), Iran, and nations with similar levels of development, 20% nations with lower levels (medium) of development (assuming 0.05 Tg per detonation for those) a) with its estimated (estimated number of warheads varies, likeliest current number) 90 nuclear warheads (causing A: 1.49 Tg, B: 1.78 Tg, C: 2.1 Tg, D: 2.43 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) with 150 nuclear warheads (causing A: 2.43 Tg, B: 2.97 Tg, C: 3.51 Tg, D: 4.05 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) with 250 nuclear warheads (causing A: 4.05 Tg, B: 4.95 Tg, C: 5.85 Tg, D: 6.75 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) with 400 (highest estimated number, highly unlikely) nuclear warheads (causing A: 6.48 Tg, B: 7.92 Tg, C: 9.36 Tg, D: 10.8 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere)
6.Special 1: Iran (currently has enough fissile material for ~ 5 warheads) develops nuclear weapons (possible, may happen) and is part of the Chinese-Russian faction and targets US and allies with a success rate of 80% with an attack plan of 1:1 with: a) 5 warheads, based on current fissile material (causing A: 0.01 Tg, B: 0.02 Tg, C: 0.03 Tg, D: 0.04 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 35 warheads, assuming sufficient material to produce 5 warheads each year until 2030 (causing A: 0.07 Tg, B: 0.14 Tg, C: 0.21 Tg, D: 0.28 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 70 warheads, assuming a faster development and expansion of their nuclear arsenal until 2030 (causing A: 0.14 Tg, B: 0.28 Tg, C: 0.42 Tg, D: 0.56 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 100 warheads, assuming a significantly faster development and expansion of their nuclear arsenal until 2030 (causing A: 0.2 Tg, B: 0.4 Tg, C: 0.6 Tg, D: 0.8 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 7.Special 2: Germany, or an EU program for a shared nuclear arsenal, in addition to the French arsenal, results in the development of a nuclear arsenal (currently unlikely, might happen if global tensions increase) with a success rate of 90% 7.1 following a 2:1 attack plan with: a) 100 warheads (causing A: 0.45 Tg, B: 0.675 Tg, C: 0.9 Tg, D: 1.13 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 200 warheads (causing A: 0.9 Tg, B: 1.35 Tg, C: 1.8 Tg, D: 2.25 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 300 warheads (causing A: 1.35 Tg, B: 2.03 Tg, C: 2.7 Tg, D: 3.38 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 400 warheads (causing A: 1.8 Tg, B: 2.7 Tg, C: 3.6 Tg, D: 4.5 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 7.2 following a 1:1 attack plan with: a) 100 warheads (causing A: 0.9 Tg, B: 1.35 Tg, C: 1.8 Tg, D: 2.25 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 200 warheads (causing A: 1.8 Tg, B: 2.7 Tg, C: 3.6 Tg, D: 4.5 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 300 warheads (causing A: 2.7 Tg, B: 4.05 Tg, C: 5.4 Tg, D: 6.75 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 400 warheads (causing A: 3.6 Tg, B: 5.4 Tg, C: 7.2 Tg, D: 9 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere)
8.Special 3: Russia (this will include calculations based on target and considers Russia’s non-deployed stockpile) and China with a 90% success rate: 8.1 target only highly developed nations following a 2:1 attack plan with: a) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 2.81 Tg, B: 5.61 Tg, C: 8.41 Tg, D: 11.22 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 3.09 Tg, B: 6.17 Tg, C: 9.26 Tg, D: 12.35 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 3.65 Tg, B: 7.30 Tg, C: 10.95 Tg, D: 14.60 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 3 Tg, B: 6.01 Tg, C: 9.02 Tg, D: 12.03 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) e) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 3.28 Tg, B: 6.58 Tg, C: 9.87 Tg, D: 13.16 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) f) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 3.82 Tg, B: 7.7 Tg, C: 11.56 Tg, D: 15.41 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 8.2 target 90% highly developed nations, 5% nations with development levels comparable with China & Russia (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia), 5% nations with a lower level (medium) of development (e.g. India) following a 2:1 attack plan with: a) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads (causing A: 5.30 Tg, B: 7.82 Tg, C: 10.35 Tg, D: 12.87 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 5.89 Tg, B: 8.70 Tg, C: 11.50 Tg, D: 14.30 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 6.48 Tg, B: 9.57 Tg, C: 12.66 Tg, D: 15.74 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 7.66 Tg, B: 11.31 Tg, C: 14.96 Tg, D: 18.61 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) e) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads (causing A: 5.73 Tg, B: 8.45 Tg, C: 11.18 Tg, D: 13.91 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) f) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 6.32 Tg, B: 9.33 Tg, C: 12.33 Tg, D: 15.34 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) g) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 6.91 Tg, B: 10.20 Tg, C: 13.49 Tg, D: 16.78 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) h) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 8.09 Tg, B: 11.94 Tg, C: 15.79 Tg, D: 19.64 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 8.3 target only highly developed nations following a 1.5:1 attack plan with: a) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 3.74 Tg, B: 7.48 Tg, C:11.22 Tg, D: 14.96 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 4.12 Tg, B: 8.23 Tg, C: 12.35 Tg, D: 16.46 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 4.87 Tg, B: 9.73 Tg, C: 14.6 Tg, D: 19.46 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 4.01 Tg, B: 8.02 Tg, C: 12.03 Tg, D: 16.04 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) e) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 4.39 Tg, B: 8.77 Tg, C: 13.16 Tg, D: 17.54 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) f) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 5.14 Tg, B: 10.27 Tg, C: 15.41 Tg, D: 20.54 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 8.4 target 90% highly developed nations, 5% nations with development levels comparable with China & Russia (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia), 5% nations with a lower level (medium) of development (e.g. India) following a 1:1 attack plan with: a) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads (causing A: 10.60 Tg, B: 15.65 Tg, C: 20.7 Tg, D: 25.75 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 11.78 Tg, B:17.4 Tg, C: 23 Tg, D: 28.6 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 12.96 Tg, B: 19.14 Tg, C: 25.32 Tg, D: 31.48 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) d) 570 Chinese warheads (FAS estimate trendline), 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 15.32 Tg, B: 22.62 Tg, C: 29.92 Tg, D: 37.22 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) e) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads (causing A: 11.46 Tg, B: 16.9 Tg, C: 22.36 Tg, D: 27.82 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) f) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 250 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 12.64 Tg, B: 9.33 Tg, C: 18.66 Tg, D: 30.68 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) g) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 500 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 13.82 Tg, B: 20.4 Tg, C: 26.98 Tg, D: 33.56 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) h) 750 Chinese warheads, 1674 Russian warheads, and 1000 additional warheads from Russia’s stockpile (causing A: 16.18 Tg, B: 23.88 Tg, C: 31.58 Tg, D: 39.28 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere)
9.Special 4: In response to escalating tensions, the US deploys currently non-deployed nuclear warheads, success rate of 93%: 9.1 following an attack plan of 2:1, targeting Russia, China, and hostile nations of similar development level (North Korea is negligible due to its relatively small area and arsenal, Pakistan is either not involved or already being targeted by India): a) 1800 nuclear warheads, an additional 200 from the stockpile (causing A: 10 Tg, B: 15 Tg, C: 20 Tg, D: 25 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 1800 nuclear warheads, an additional 500 from the stockpile (causing A: 11.5 Tg, B: 17.25 Tg, C: 23 Tg, D: 28.75 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 1800 nuclear warheads, an additional 1000 from the stockpile (causing A: 14 Tg, B: 21 Tg, C: 28 Tg, D: 35 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 9.2 following an attack plan of 1.5:1, targeting Russia, China, and hostile nations of similar development level (North Korea is negligible due to its relatively small area and arsenal, Pakistan is either not involved or already being targeted by India): a) 1800 nuclear warheads, an additional 200 from the stockpile (causing A: 13.33 Tg, B: 20 Tg, C: 26.66 Tg, D: 33.33 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) 1800 nuclear warheads, an additional 500 from the stockpile (causing A: 15.3 Tg, B: 23 Tg, C: 30.66 Tg, D: 38.33 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) 1800 nuclear warheads, an additional 1000 from the stockpile (causing A: 18.67 Tg, B: 28 Tg, C: 37.33 Tg, D: 46.67 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere)
10.Special 5: France and the UK may expand their nuclear arsenals due to rising tensions until 2030, a success rate of 90%, targeting Russia, China, and hostile nations of similar development level: 10.1 following a 2:1 attack plan: a) current French 290 nuclear warheads, current British 225 nuclear warheads (causing A: 2.32 Tg, B: 3.48 Tg, C: 4.64 Tg, D: 5.79 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) current French 290 nuclear warheads, current British 225 nuclear warheads, an additional 50 French nuclear warheads, an additional 35 British nuclear warheads (causing A: 2.7 Tg, B: 4.05 Tg, C: 5.4 Tg, D: 6.75 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) a total of 400 French nuclear warheads and, a total of 300 British nuclear warheads (causing A: 3.15 Tg, B: 4.73 Tg, C: 6.3 Tg, D: 7.88 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) 10.2 following a 1.5 attack plan: a) current French 290 nuclear warheads, current British 225 nuclear warheads (causing A: 3.09 Tg, B: 4.64 Tg, C: 6.18 Tg, D: 7.73 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) b) current French 290 nuclear warheads, current British 225 nuclear warheads, an additional 50 French nuclear warheads, an additional 35 British nuclear warheads (causing A: 3.6 Tg, B: 5.4 Tg, C: 7.2 Tg, D: 9 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere) c) a total of 400 French nuclear warheads, total of 300 British nuclear warheads (causing A: 4.2 Tg, B: 6.3 Tg, C: 8.4 Tg, D: 10.5 Tg to be injected into the stratosphere)
Worst Case Scenario:
caused by the US: 46.67 Tg
caused by Russia and China: 39.28 + 6 = 45.28 Tg
caused by the UK and France: 10.5 Tg
Total: 102.45 Tg
further potentially:
caused by India: 16 Tg
caused by Pakistan: 10 Tg
caused Germany/EU: 9 Tg
caused by Israel: 10.8 Tg
caused by Iran: 0.8 Tg
caused by North Korea: 0.4 Tg
Maximum Total: 149.45 Tg
149.45 Tg of soot in the stratosphere would likely cause what we generally consider a nuclear winter, causing global temperatures to decrease significantly, which would make survival extremely difficult for an extended period of time. “This analysis suggests that cropland solar radiation would be lowest between years 1 and 2 post-war, and take at least 10 years to return to normal. Cropland precipitation would be lowest around year 4 post-war, and also take at least 10 years to return to normal. A 61% reduction in major food crops and marine fish.”
However, for the worst-case scenario to occur several unrealistic things would need to happen.
In this scenario, the EU/Germany and Iran develop a nuclear arsenal, China has a larger arsenal (than the projected 570 warheads), Russia and the US deploy 1000 nuclear warheads each from their stockpiles (which they would not be able to do fast), and other nuclearized nations all greatly expand their nuclear arsenal.
Further, it is contingent on the assumption that low-yield nuclear bombs would still cause firestorms, a high frequency thereof, as well as soot reaching the stratosphere in amounts that contradict more recent findings.
A more realistic scenario, which still entirely disregards the requirement for high-yield warheads and assumes relatively high levels of soot:
Caused by the US: max. 9 to 13 Tg
Caused by France and the UK: max. 2.32 - 3.6 Tg
Caused by China and Russia: max. 8.81 - 18.64 Tg
Total: max 20.13 - 35.24 Tg (this is still unrealistically high)
Further potentially:
caused by India: max 7 Tg
caused by Pakistan: max. 7 Tg
caused Germany/EU: max 1.35 Tg
caused by Israel: max 1.35 Tg
caused by Iran: max 0.14 Tg
caused by North Korea: max 0.1 Tg
Max total: 37.07 - 52.18 (still unrealistically high)
A more realistic expectation is that 8 to a maximum of 25 Tg (I would personally assume in the range of 10-18 Tg) of soot would be elevated to the stratosphere, thus, resulting in an average global temperature drop ranging from 0.8 to 5 K, but most likely in the range of 0.8 to 4 K for ca. 14 months to 60 months.
Further, acknowledging the events of 1990/1991, certain regions may experience similar drops in temperature as the Middle East did for 3-8 months (negative) 4-6 K. Therefore, in some regions temperatures may be 0.8 to 10 K lower than they would be on average The northern hemisphere would generally be more affected than the southern hemisphere as nations with nuclear weapons and targets largely are located in the northern hemisphere.
I created this map based on the US oil fields and prevalent winds to indicate which areas could plausibly be affected by regional sun blockage and thereby have more extreme temperature anomalies.
A global temperature drop by 0.8 to 4 K is survivable, though the blockage of sunlight in certain regions (due to other circumstances that may be caused similar to the situation in the Middle East back then) could have significant effects on regional food supply, especially considering that global supply chains may require significant amounts of time to be re-established and adapted.
(Apart from that, in a scenario where a devastating nuclear winter–as 150 Tg of soot in the stratosphere would cause–occurs, survival in the northern hemisphere would become extremely challenging. " Under the 150 Tg case, most countries would have less than 25% of the population survive by the end of Year 2.")
That is incorrect. Many military bases and installations, as well as the 450 US nuclear missile silos are in sparsely populated areas, if one targets them with an attack plan of 2:1 one already dedicates about 900 warheads, solely to target the missile silos.
That’s too simplistic. Most counterforce targets are not in the most densely populated areas, to target them, one has to target fewer countervalue targets. There are 333 cities in the US with a population of more than 100,000.
Further, in densely populated areas firestorms are incredibly unlikely to occur thanks to modern city design and construction. Further, the overpressure caused by airburst detonations is considerably lower (surface bursts are used precisely because of this to destroy hardened sites which may require upwards of 2000 psi overpressure). Therefore, it is wrong to describe it as a 10km radius of destruction.
For a 10km radius of moderate damage with 5 psi, more than 3MT are required. The 6 Chinese 5 MT nuclear bombs would have a moderate blast damage radius of ca.10.7 to 12 km (airburst).
Moderate damage radius for other yields (airburst):
1.2 MT (US, unspecified amount, Biden announced in 2022 plans to retire the B83) = ca 7.5 km
1 MT (has currently no one) = ca. 7 km
800 kt = ca. 6 to 6.5 km
600 kt = ca. 5.9 km
500 kt = ca. 5.5 km
400 kt = ca. 5.2 km
300 kt = ca. 4.7 km
200 kt = ca. 4.1 km
100 kt = ca 3.26 km
50 kt = ca. 2.6 km
20 kt = ca. 1.9 km
10 kt = ca. 1.5 km
(most nuclear weapons have 300 to 600 kt)
Airburst nuclear warheads generate little to no fallout. For them to generate fallout they would have to be carried out at suboptimal heights, which would decrease the moderate blast damage area, etc.
That is too simplistic. In Preparing for the Aftermath of a Nuclear Detonation; an Analytic Framework for Disaster Management it is stated that “the primary delayed effect from a ground-level nuclear detonation is from ‘fallout’ (Figure 2). Fallout is generated when the dust and debris excavated by the explosion combine with radioactive fission products and are drawn upward by the heat of the event. This cloud rapidly climbs through the atmosphere, up to 5 miles high for a 10kt, and highly radioactive particles coalesce and drop back down to earth as it cools. It is important to note that Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not have significant fallout because their detonations occurred at altitude. The hazard from fallout comes not from breathing the particles, but from being exposed to the ionizing radiation they give off after they have settled on the ground and building roofs. Radiation levels from these particles will drop off quickly: most (55%) of the potential exposure occurs in the first hour, and 80% occurs within the first day. Although they are highly dependent on weather conditions, the most dangerous concentrations of fallout particles (i.e., potentially fatal to those outside) occur within 10 miles downwind of the event and are clearly visible as they fall, often the size of fine sand or table salt.”
“The document identified a zoned approach to facilitate response planning, with the key zones defined as:
-Light Damage Zone: Windows mostly broken; injuries requiring self- or outpatient-care.
-Moderate Damage Zone: Significant building damage and rubble, downed utility poles, overturned automobiles, fires, many serious injuries; greatest lifesaving opportunities.
-Severe Damage Zone: Most buildings destroyed; radiation prevents entry into the area; lifesaving not likely.
-Dangerous Fallout Zone: Area where large doses could be delivered to the unsheltered public and emergency responders in a short period of time. This is the dark purple area in Fig. 8.
-Hot Zone or 0.01 R/h Boundary: Areas where emergency operations can be safely performed provided that responders take appropriate planning and dose monitoring and control measures. This is the light purple area in Figure 8.”
To suffer fallout-related mass fatalities after a surface burst, people would need to actively go out of their way to put themselves in harm’s way, e.g., by going outside in the DFZ, or Hot Zone (unless absolutely necessary) soon after the impact. Of course, for larger warheads detonated using surface bursts, the area would be larger, that is why countermeasures to reduce exposure are important.
"In contrast to literature that discusses medical radiation countermeasures (i.e., chemical agents for reducing radiation injury and risk of radiation-related disease, typically administered after the exposure is received; for example, Obrador et al. 2020), here we refer to countermeasures as physical procedures that prevent or reduce possible exposure (NRC 2004). Some possible countermeasure procedures are sheltering, evacuation, food interdiction, environmental remediation, prophylactic administration of stable and competing nuclides, and chelation therapy. While the models discussed in the companion papers assume no countermeasures or remediation that could prevent or reduce possible exposure, here we discuss how our models might be adapted to account for such practices.
"Sheltering, sometimes referred to as sheltering-in-place, simply refers to the purposeful act of staying indoors to achieve the greatest possible shielding from external radiation originating from descending and deposited fallout. The estimation of external dose can be easily modified to account for sheltering-in-place by modification of the time spent indoors and the location factors. See Appendix E of Bouville et al. (2022) for various values that could be customized for other conditions as needed.
"Accounting for evacuation in the external dose models would necessitate, for example, truncation of the integration period over which dose is accumulated (eqn 1 of Bouville et al. 2022). Some consideration needs to be given to the possibility that only a reduced exposure-rate, rather than 0, might be received at the location to which evacuation is assumed.
"The concept of food interdiction, i.e., removing contaminated foodstuffs from public availability, is preferably implemented immediately after contamination is realized but before consumption begins. In that case, modifications of internal dose models would be a simple step to zero-out the rate of intake of the contaminated foods. Here, similar to the case for external dose, consideration needs to be given to the possible (but probably lower) contamination of foods that replace those interdicted. In contrast, if food interdiction is assumed to occur sometime after public consumption has begun, modifications to assessment models need to be specific for the date at which the food availability is interrupted.
"Environmental remediation is also possible during the exposure period as an attempt to reduce ongoing exposure from ground contamination (Cox et al. 2005). For example, urban surfaces, e.g., streets and houses, can be washed to remove surficial contamination. For modeling the effects of such activities on external dose received, the changes to the dose model would be similar to the case of evacuating to a different location with a presumably reduced exposure rate. The initial date of the remediation (relative to the date of deposition) would be needed, coupled with a post-remediation exposure rate for the remainder of the exposure period. External dose models can be modified to account for the effectiveness of various countermeasures (Thiessen et al. 2009).
"Environmental remediation of crop and pastureland can also be implemented by physical removal of contaminated soil, deep ploughing of contaminated soil so as to reduce the average surface concentration, and chemical soil amendments to prevent uptake of radionuclides into crops. Activities to reduce possible internal doses by reducing uptake of radioactivity into plants is generally a long-term initiative and would not likely be part of a short-term emergency response. For that reason, it is unlikely that internal dose estimates for the months soon after a detonation would need to reflect environmental remediation, though, if necessary, the internal dose model can be adapted to reflect the periods of time over which uptake occurs and the degree of uptake, both of which could be amended to reflect remediation.
"Prevention of internal dose to the thyroid gland from internally deposited radioiodines is possible through the prophylactic administration of stable iodine (NRC 2004). In the case of administered stable iodine, the uptake of radioactive iodine is reduced or prevented. As discussed in the literature, the timing of the administration of stable iodine, usually in the form of potassium iodide, is critical to its success for preventing internal dose. Modification of the internal dose calculations to account for prophylactic administration of stable iodine would be to significantly reduce the uptake of iodine by the thyroid gland. It has been reported that 95% of the thyroid dose can be averted by proper administration of stable iodine (Verger et al. 2001).
“For a limited number of other radionuclides that might result in internal exposure from fallout, some internal dose can be averted by chelation therapy, i.e., administration of compounds to increase the rate of excretion of the radionuclide from the body and, thereby, reduce the absorbed radiation. REMM14 and NCRP (2008) present a summary of radionuclides for which chelation therapy can be attempted and the treatment compounds to be used. The modification of dose-assessment calculations for chelation therapy, however, would involve modification of the biokinetic models used for calculations of the dose coefficients (Melo et al. 2022), a subject beyond this discussion. Melo et al. (2022) show that DCs cannot be easily adjusted based on the f1 factor alone.”
Here is an interesting article concerning food supply for nuclear winter scenarios:
PS: By pointing these things out, I do not mean to convey that I don’t like the story, I only seek to provide information and discuss these things. What stood out to me the most in your story was the tone–I must reiterate that I really enjoyed reading the WIP.
Should you believe my comments to be a “very bad thesis”, then I must, unfortunately, disappoint you.
My comments lack a clear research question/the scope is too broad, are essentially a collection of information without adding anything new, are not written in a thesis format, and fail to follow the proper standards.
For many reasons, the comments could never be a “thesis”–a person familiar with theses and dissertations would be aware of that.
@cassiopeios@Dragomer Guys, please do not start an argument over this. I value an open discussion and many different opinions, but please stay friendly. I agree with Dragomer, that we should not dive too deep into the scientific components of nuclear war in this thread. I value your input cassiopeios, and I will reply to some of your recent questions and remarks, but please understand that I cannot reply to every point you made, because a) I do not have the time at the moment and b) I’m not an expert in this field. While I did do a lot of research on the topic and am confident in the underlying assumptions I made for the scenario, in the end it remains a work of fiction, and it will therefore deviate from the reality in some aspects. So please bear with me if my answers are not quite as comprehensive as your original questions and comments.
I have of course thought about other countries being involved in this war, and while I do not have a final answer regarding every country (the main focus of the game is the US) here are some of the countries that are also being attacked:
France: Major member of NATO and nuclear-weapon state.
UK: Major member of NATO and nuclear-weapon state
Italy: Major member of NATO and part of nuclear weapon sharing
Germany: Major member of NATO and part of nuclear weapon sharing
Turkey: Major member of NATO and part of nuclear weapon sharing
Netherlands: Part of nuclear weapon sharing
Belgium: Part of nuclear weapon sharing
Japan: Regional power in the pacific region, major ally of the US
South Korea: Regional power in the pacific region, major ally of the US
It may or may not be inflated. We do not know for sure. But taking the US government as a source is an acceptable choice in my opinion. Also, for my scenario to work, we have to assume the US assumption is correct.
I agree, the average warhead used against the US will be in the 100-800 KT range. The few chinese MT warheads are a rare exception.
Other nuclear weapon states may have done so. But it is not very likely in my opinion. Nuclear weapons are expensive to manufacture and maintain, and countries like France or the UK are unlikely to expose themselves to the anger of the public (higher military budgets often mean budget cuts in other areas).
I’m referring to my story. I have noted your point, and will think about emphasizing the high tensions even more.
Correct, Russia launches it’s attack simultaneously with China on targets in Europe. At the end of the prologue in the final news report there is a mention of the US having launched it’s missiles as a retaliatory measure.
There is actually such a mention in the game. At some point the player can watch some TV and will learn about Russia having thrown their public support behind China after the incident in the South China Sea. But I can expand this section even more or give players another hint elsewhere in the prologue.
I may have been imprecise with my language here. In my opinion, it delivers realistic results. The simulator uses the following models and sources for it’s calculations:
Thermal radiation is calculated by digitizing the model in Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan “The effects of nuclear weapons”, Third Edition 1977.
Fallout is calculated using the WSEG10 model. An alternative HYSPLIT-based model is available to calculate the total integrated fallout dose or the H+1 dose rate.
Prompt radiation is calculated using the data in Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan “The effects of nuclear weapons”, Third Edition 1977
Height of burst at which fallout occurs is calculated using the equation from Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan “The effects of nuclear weapons”, Third Edition 1977.
Relative flash intensity and peak time are calculated from yield using the equations from Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan “The effects of nuclear weapons”, Third Edition 1977.
Conditions for mass fires are determined as a threshold of thermal radiation and population density with the Binninger model and values from “Nuclear war between Israel and Iran” by Dallas et al. 2013. Based on data from World War II, the fuel density threshold for mass fires is usually assumed to be 8 pounds fuel per square foot, which corresponds to a population density of 3550 /km^2 if we use the data in “Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan and India portend regional and global catastrophe” by Brian Toon et al. Science Advances 02 Oct 2019.
Soot calculation is adapted from Brian Toon, Alan Robock and Rich Turco “Environmental consequences of nuclear war” 2008 and is limited to areas affected by probable fires. This model is work in progress and will be extended in the future. Extrapolation of the temperature curve from Toon et al, Physics Today 61 , 12, 37 (2008) “Environmental consequences of nuclear war” is used to estimate the average global cooling.
I’m not quite sure where I have been incorrect here? I did not deny that sparsely populated areas would be attacked. I said: “In less dense areas with targets like military bases or missile silos, enemies would likely use surface bursts, which cause less immediate destruction but produce massive amounts of fallout, potentially leading to significant casualties even far from ground zero. States like Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Utah, Nebraska, etc., could suffer many fatalities even with few direct detonations.”
